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and conditional use permit CU 95-2. Claimant also asserts that the City has enforced land use <br />regulations against the subject property “in no less than two Court of Appeals cases and a variety <br />of Land Use Board of Appeals (“LUBA”) cases.” This argument again ignores the actual words <br />of Measure 37. For regulations that existed prior to the effective date of Measure 37, the <br />enforces <br />measure provided that a property owner had a valid claim if a public body “ a land use <br />regulation enacted prior to December 2, 2004 . . . .” By using the term “enforces” Measure 37 <br />after <br />clearly contemplated government action enforcing a regulation December 2, 2004, the <br />effective date of Measure 37. Action on the conditional use permits referred to in the letter took <br />place well before December 2, 2004. All the decisions rendered in the litigation referred to by <br />Claimant were also made before December 2, 2004. Thus, all of the “enforcement” actions <br />referred to by Claimant took place before the effective date of Measure 37 and therefore do not <br />constitute enforcement of a land use regulation under the plain language of the measure. <br />3. Restriction on Use: The Conditional Use Agreement <br />Claimant argues that the conditional use permit or agreement (CUP) applicable to the <br />property is a de facto land use regulation because it is the culmination of many land use <br />regulations. The plain language of Measure 37 does not support Claimant’s argument. Measure <br />37 does not recognize de facto land use regulations. Measure 37 defines “land use regulation” as <br />“[l]ocal government comprehensive plans, zoning ordinances, land division ordinances, and <br />transportation ordinances.” The CUP is not a comprehensive plan, zoning ordinance, land <br />division ordinance, nor a transportation ordinance. <br />As acknowledged by Claimant, the CUP is in fact a contract. Near the beginning of the <br />conditional use agreement, Claimant agreed, in part, that: <br />Development of the project in strict compliance with the plans as submitted <br />“ <br />and approved is necessary to protect the public health, safety and welfare. <br /> <br />Therefore, the public interest requires the City obtain from the Developer an <br />enforceable covenant to develop in accordance with the plans as submitted and <br />approved.” (Emphasis added.) <br />Near the end of the conditional use agreement, Claimant also agreed that: <br />“This Agreement shall be binding upon the heirs, executors, administrators and <br />assigns of both parties and is a condition and covenant running with the land and <br />binding upon the above-described areas of real property.” <br /> Claimant next argues that even if the CUP is not a land use regulation, it may some day <br />be amended or rescinded, at which time the City’s land use regulations will return to force and <br />restrict the use of the subject property. While that may be a possibility, Claimant has no right to <br />have the agreement amended. In fact, Claimant obtained a financial benefit from the conditional <br />use permit and agreement, and is now seeking to keep the benefit of the agreement without <br />having to honor the burden of the agreement. Measure 37 does not apply to such agreements. <br /> Claimant also argues that the CUP does not restrict 15 acres of the property. Claimant <br />ignores not only the specific provisions of the agreement in making that argument, but also the <br />“quid pro quo” to which Claimant agreed in order to get the benefits that Claimant sought from <br /> <br /> <br />