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<br /> 0'-)"""'~ <br /> ~Oi <br />e <br /> . -- - - - ~ - - - --- _~__ "__.h ____ .._~ - -- ---- -- -~ ---- _._- ---- <br />--- !I -------~ - ----~--~----------------- ---- "--~-~---C='C".=-C=7~~.~7~---r'----~-=-:-c-- <br /> I. <br />I :1 I <br /> Ii THUS, WHILE A TENANCY fOR YEARS MAY BE LIMITED BY DEED, THE LANDLORD-TENANT RELATION- <br /> II SHIP HAS AS ONE Of ITS CARDINAL fEATURES, .THE RETURN Of CONSIDERATION BY THE TENANT, THE <br /> " CI TV . <br /> Ii IN THIS INSTANCE. . <br /> ! <br /> If THE OREGON SUPREME COURT WERE TO ADOPT THIS INTERPRETATION, THE STATUTORY I NTER- -I <br /> 'I <br /> " <br /> Ii PRETATION AS TO THE PROVISO CLAUSE WOULD R&SULT IN THE CONCLUSION .THAT THE LEGISLATURE <br /> Ii INTENDED THE TERMS "ALIENATED" AND "C-ONVEYANCE tt IN THIS STATUTE TO APPLY TO TOTAL DIVEST- <br /> II MENTS Of THE COUNTY'S INTEREST IN LAND, AND NOT TO -LEASES, SINCE THE PROVISO IS THAT THE <br /> I' <br /> I "CONVEYANCE" BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION. THE LEGISLATION COULD NOT HAVE INTENDED THE LEASE <br /> I' <br /> ': TO BE WITHOUT CONSIDERATION; SINCE IT WOULD THEN BE NO LEASE AT A~L. CONSEQUENTLY, THE <br /> ii <br /> " STATUTE DOES NOT fORBID A LEASING AGREEMENT fOR -VALUABLE CONSIDERATION. <br /> Ii <br /> ,I (A) IT IS THE OPINION Of THIS OffICE, THEREfORE, TH~T A 99 YEAR LEASE AT REASONABLE <br /> il <br /> . RENTAL IS NOT PROHIBITED BY THIS STATUTE BUT CAUTIONS THAT IT WOULD BE WISE TO <br /> II OBTAIN A DECLARATORY JUDGMENT Of THE RIGHTS Of THE PARTIES BEfORE EXTENSIVE <br /> II EXPENDITURES ARE MADE. <br /> I, <, <br />e Ii 4. You MAY ALSO BE ADVISED THAT THE POSITION Of THE CITY AND COUNTY IN THIS MATTER <br /> i: MAY BE STRENGTHENED BY THE fACT THAT A BENEfiCIAL PUBLIC PURPOSE IS THE OBJECTIVE Of THE <br /> Ii PROPOSALS. JUDICIAL fAVORITISM fOR fURTHE~ING A PUBLIC PURPOSE IS COMMONPLACE. ILLUSTRA- <br /> T I VE Of T.H IS IS THE DICTUM Of THE NEW YORK COURT IN DISCUSSING A LEASE Of CITY LANDS IN THE <br /> " fACE Of A STATUTE PROHIBITING "ALIENATION": <br /> " <br /> " <br /> it , IT CANNOT BE ACCURATELY SAID ~HAT A LEASE Of THE PUBLIC PROPERTY SPECifiED <br />I I: . . . <br /> I ~ IN SECTION 71 IS VOID, If IT NECESSARILY CARRIES OUT A PUBLIC PURPOSE AUTHORIZED <br /> I! IN ANY OTHER SECTION. , <br /> I: <br /> I: 6. You HAVE "ALSO INQ~IRED CONCERNING THE POSSIBLE RESTRICTIONS AS TO THE USE <br /> WHICH THE-COUNTY CAN MAKE Of THIS PROPERTY CONTAINED IN THE ORIGINAL DEED TO THE COURT <br /> fROM CHARNEL MULLIGAN AND WIfE. <br /> , <br /> ii <br /> 1 AN EXAMINATION Of THE DEED ON RECORD SHOWS THE fOLLOWING AS ~HE ONLY POSSIBLE LANGUAGE <br /> I <br /> I IN THE DEED WHICH ~OULD BE CONSTRUED AS A RESTRICiION: <br /> I <br /> I "WITNESSETH: THAT THE SAID PARTY Of THE fiRST PART ~OR AND <br /> Ii IN CONSIDERATION Of THE <br /> SUM Of ONE DOLLAR TO THEM IN HAND PAID, TH~ RECEIPT WHEREOf IS HEREBY ACKNOWLEDGED <br />." I. AND fOR THE fURTHER CONSIDERATION THAT EUGENE CITY; SEAT Of JUSTICE fOR SAID <br /> I! <br /> COUNTY Of LANE HAS BEEN LOCATED, PARTL.-Y THEREON, HAVE BARGAINED AND SOLD BY THESE <br /> I: PRESENTS... , <br /> THE OREGON SUPREME COURT HAS ADHERED TO THE RULE ESPOUSED BY THE GREAT WEIGHT Of <br /> Ii <br /> II AUTHORITY IN THIS COUNTRY THAT RESTRICTIVE COVENANTS IN DEEDS ARE TO BE STRICTLY CON- <br /> II STRUED. THE COURT HAS SAID: <br /> " <br /> Ii 'AND AN ESTATE UPON CONDITION ~ANNOT BE CREATED BY DEED, EXCEPT WHERE THE TERMS <br /> Ii Of THE GRANT WILL ADMIT Of NO OTHER REASONABLE INTERPRET~TION...OUR CONCLUSIONS <br /> ON THIS POINT ARE STRENGTHENED BY THE fACT THAT THE APPELLANTS ARE I NVOLl NG A <br /> I: TECHNICAL RULE Of THE COMMON LAW, WHICH RULE HAS NEVER BEEN fAVORED BY THE COURTS, <br />I II <br /> Ii BU~ IS ALWAYS ~ONSTRUED STRICTLY. , <br /> I: RALEY V. UMATILLA COUNTY, 15 OR. 180, 181 . <br /> !I <br /> Ii . <br /> I: THE REASON FOR THIS RULE IS THAT THE COURTS ABHOR A fORFEITURE 'WHICH WOULD RESULT <br /> If A RESTRICTION WERE ALLOWED LIBERAL INTERPRETATION. <br /> : <br /> il SEE EXCELLENT ANALYSIS IN ~STATES AND CONDITIONS SUBSEQUENT AND ESTATES ON SPECIAL <br />e II LIMITATION, BY KENNETH J. O'CONNEL, PROfESSOR Of LAW, UNIVERSITY Of OREGON, <br /> I: COLLEGE Of LAW, 18 OREGON LAW REVIEW 63 AT P. 76. <br /> II <br /> Ii <br /> ii Of GREAT IMPORTANCE ALSO IS THE fACT THAT THE MULLIGAN DEEDS WERE GRANTED fOR A ~ <br /> I: PUBLIC PURPOSE. THIS CIRCUMSTANCE HAS BEEN TAKEN BY THE OREGON SUPRSME COURT AS AN <br /> \i INDICATION THAT A fORfEITURE IS NOT INTENDED BY CONDITIONAL OR LIMITING WORDS I N THE <br /> DEED. CITY Of PORTLAND V. TERWILLIGER, 16 OR. 465. <br /> I' (A) <br /> , IT IS TH€ OPINION Of THIS OfFICE THAT THE WORDS QUOTED ABOVE fROM THE MULLIGAN <br /> I' <br /> I, <br /> i! DEEDS IS NON-RESTRICTIVE IN NATURE. <br /> I! I <br /> Ii (B) IT IS THE OPINION Of THIS OffiCE THAT CLAIMS ASSERTED ON THE BASIS Of THIS <br /> II LANGUAGE COULD BE SUCCESSfULLY DEfEATED SHOULD LITIGATION ARISE. tI <br /> I <br /> , <br /> I <br /> , <br /> : IT WAS MOVED BY M~. SIEGENTHALER, SECONDED BY MR. BOOTH, THA T THE RE PORT BE REfERRED TO' <br /> t <br /> THE SPECIAL COMMITTEE fOR CIVIC CENTER. MOTION CARRIED. <br />I <br /> , , <br /> ( <br /> I <br /> o. <br />e <br /> ~ <br />- <br />