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Police Complaint System and Civilian Oversight Recommendations <br /> <br />In spite of these challenges, committee members agreed that community expectations for an <br />independent, credible complaint process that is accountable to the public would not be met with <br />just an auditor in place. Similarly, the committee did not believe that a review board alone <br />would help identify the procedural and training changes that would improve not only the <br />complaint system, but enhance police services to the public. <br /> <br />With a focus on hybrid oversight models, the committee developed four distinct civilian review <br />board models and requested City Attorney advice on the legal and employee contract challenges <br />associated with implementing each variation. Several common characteristics were shared <br />between all the civilian review board models under consideration: <br /> <br /> o The review board would be comprised of community volunteers appointed/selected <br /> by the Mayor and City Council. <br /> <br /> o Staff support to the board would be provided through a police auditor's office, which <br /> at a minimum, reports to the board on complaint trends/statistics and other work <br /> relevant to the auditor's office. The review board and the auditor would provide <br /> trends and policy information to the Police Commission. <br /> <br /> o Investigations would normally be conducted by the internal affairs unit and monitored <br /> by the auditor, although the auditor would have the authority to request additional or <br /> outside investigations. <br /> <br /> o Final decisions for employee discipline would remain with the Chief of Police. <br /> <br /> o A charter amendment would be required to enable the City Council to appoint a <br /> civilian review board that reviews complaints surrounding employee conduct and to <br /> allow the hiring of an auditor that is answerable to the City Council. <br /> <br /> o Review board meetings would be open to the public; confidentiality issues should be <br /> addressed through procedural or contract negotiation avenues. <br /> <br />Of the four models discussed, the committee was least interested in a system that allowed <br />complainants to appeal the outcome of their investigation to the civilian review board. These <br />systems posed the most potential for legal and employee contract problems, could become a <br />costly, adversarial and duplicative quasi-judicial proceeding, and were unlikely to create <br />improved satisfaction from those involved in the process (appellants, review board members, and <br />employees alike). <br /> <br />The committee agreed that its preferred options were a: <br /> o Bifurcated Investigation Model, where the board would oversee specific cases as they <br /> were being investigated and with the auditor, would develop findings on those cases <br /> prior to the Chief developing an adjudication; and <br /> o Closed Complaint Review, where a complainant can present concerns about the <br /> outcome of the case to the review board, which will review the file and develop <br /> findings on the case for delivery to the auditor and Chief of Police, but would not <br /> impact the outcome of the investigation. <br /> <br /> 7 <br /> <br /> <br />