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Admin Order 58-20-26
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Admin Order 58-20-26
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8/25/2020 11:00:30 AM
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Teri Higgins <br />June 30, 2016 <br />Page 9 <br />Three potential general vulnerabilities for Eugene pump stations include: 1) power interruption, 2) <br />electrical and control cabinet toppling, and 3) site liquefaction. The general status of items 1) and 3) are <br />shown on Table 6. Regional power interruption is likely. High voltage substations transporting power <br />into the region are vulnerable. Power systems have failed following many earthquakes around the <br />world, and would be expected in a CSZ event. As the entire region could well be without power, two <br />power sources would not improve the power reliability. <br />Electrical power and control cabinets are vulnerable to toppling if they are not properly anchored. <br />During the site visits, observations inside the cabinets were not made. <br />Three of the pump stations are in low liquefaction zones (0‐5% probability). If the liquefaction occurred, <br />the pump station manhole/vault could float damaging both inlet and outlet connecting piping. Pipe is <br />ductile iron so significant differential movement would be required to cause it to fail. A better <br />understanding of the City geotechnical seismic environment should be developed, and critical facilities <br />addressed accordingly. <br />Focused discussions about each pump station that was evaluated follow. <br />Fillmore Pump Station <br />Manhole and vault structures and piping appear adequate to resist seismic loading. Submersible pumps <br />anchorage dependent of manufacturer’s design. Historically these have not failed in earthquakes <br />West Irwin <br />The pump station caisson is divided into wet‐ and dry wells with a reinforced concrete wall separation. <br />The pump station superstructure corners overhang the caisson; it is unclear whether they are <br />cantilevered or on small foundations. If they are supported on foundations, differential settlement could <br />damage the building. The brick superstructure was retrofitted with a steel frame between wall sections <br />and supporting the roof trusses. No retrofit design drawings were available. The superstructure should <br />be evaluated by a structural engineer. The brick walls are rigid and the steel frame is ductile. When <br />subjected to 2 – 3 minutes of shaking, the bricks could fall away leaving no lateral support for the <br />remaining steel columns that support the roof <br />Pump discharge lines and the discharge header lateral support appear to be inadequately braced, and <br />should be checked by a structural engineer. <br />In the event the pump station fails, it is designed to overflow to Terry St Pump Station, so pump station <br />failure may not be catastrophic. <br />2020 Eugene Wastewater Master Plan Appendix A-9
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