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<br />FN6. The appellants also contend that the state courts erred by sustaining the demurrer
<br />despite their uncontroverted allegations that the zoning ordinances would "forever preven[t] . . .
<br />development for residential use," id., at 5, and "completely destro[y] the value of [appellant's]
<br />property for any purpose or use whatsoever. . .," id., at 7. The California Supreme Court
<br />compared the express terms of the
<br />zoning ordinances with the factual allegations of the complaint. The terms of the ordinances
<br />permit construction of one to five residences on the appellants' 5-acre tract. The court
<br />therefore rejected the contention that the ordinances prevented all use of the land. Under
<br />California practice, allegations in a complaint are taken to be true unless "contrary to law or to
<br />a fact of which a court may take judicial notice." Dale v. City of Mountain View, 55 Cal.App.3d
<br />101, 105, 127 Cal.Rptr. 520, 522 (1976); see Martinez v. Socoma Cos., 11 Cal.3d 394, 399-
<br />400, 113 Cal.Rptr. 585, 588, 521 P.2d 841,844 (1974). California courts may take judicial
<br />notice of municipal ordinances. Cal.Evid.Code Ann. ~ 452(b) (West 1966). In this case, the
<br />State Supreme Court merely rejected allegations inconsistent with the explicit terms of the
<br />ordinance under review. The appellants' objection to the State Supreme Court's application of
<br />state law does not raise a federal question appropriate for review by this Court. See Patterson
<br />v. Colorado ex reI. Attorney General, 205 U.S. 454,461,27 S.Ct. 556, 557, 51 L.Ed.879
<br />(1907).
<br />
<br />*260 II
<br />The Fifth Amendment guarantees that private property shall not "be taken for public use,
<br />without just compensation." The appellants' complaint framed the question as whether a
<br />zoning ordinance that prohibits all development of their land effects a taking under the Fifth
<br />and Fourteenth Amendments. The California Supreme Court rejected the appellants'
<br />characterization of the issue by holding, as a matter of state law, that the terms of the
<br />challenged ordinances allow the appellants to construct between one and five residences on
<br />their property. The court did not consider whether the zoning ordinances would be
<br />unconstitutional if applied to prevent appellants from building five homes. Because the
<br />appellants have not submitted a plan for development of their property as the ordinances
<br />permit, there is as yet no concrete controversy regarding the application of the specific zoning
<br />provisions. See Socialist Labor Party v. Gilligan, 406 U.S. 583, 588, 92 S.Ct. 1716, 1719,32
<br />L.Ed.2d 317 (1972). See also Goldwater v. Carter, 444 U.S. 996, 997, 100 S.Ct. 533, 534, 62
<br />L.Ed.2d 428 (1979) (POWELL, J., concurring). Thus, the only question properly before us is
<br />whether the mere enactment of the zoning ordinances constitutes a taking.
<br />[4] The application of a general zoning law to particular property effects a taking if the
<br />ordinance does not substantially advance legitimate state interests, see Nectow v. Cambridge,
<br />277 U.S. 183, 188,48 S.Ct. 447, 448,72 L.Ed. 842 (1928), or denies an owner economically
<br />viable use of his land, see Penn Central Transp. Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S. 104, 138, n.
<br />36,98 S.Ct. 2646, 2666, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). The determination that governmental action
<br />constitutes a taking is, in essence, a determination that the public at large, rather than a single
<br />owner, must bear the burden of an exercise of state power in the public interest. Although no
<br />precise rule determineswhen*261 property has been taken, see Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
<br />444 U.S. 164, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 S.Ct. 332 (1979), the question necessarily requires a
<br />weighing of private and public interests. The seminal decision in Euclid v. Ambler Co., 272
<br />U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114,71 L.Ed. 303 (1926), is illustrative. In that case, the landowner
<br />challenged the constitutionality of a municipal ordinance that restricted **2142 commercial
<br />development of his property. Despite alleged diminution in value of the owner's land, the Court
<br />held that the zoning laws were facially constitutional. They bore a substantial relationship to
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