My WebLink
|
Help
|
About
|
Sign Out
Home
Browse
Search
Item B: Ordinance Concerning Goal 5 Natural Resources Study
COE
>
City of Eugene
>
Council Agendas 2005
>
CC Agenda - 10/24/05 WS
>
Item B: Ordinance Concerning Goal 5 Natural Resources Study
Metadata
Thumbnails
Annotations
Entry Properties
Last modified
6/9/2010 1:14:46 PM
Creation date
10/21/2005 9:25:45 AM
Metadata
Fields
Template:
City Council
City_Council_Document_Type
Agenda Item Summary
CMO_Meeting_Date
10/24/2005
Jump to thumbnail
< previous set
next set >
There are no annotations on this page.
Document management portal powered by Laserfiche WebLink 9 © 1998-2015
Laserfiche.
All rights reserved.
/
261
PDF
Print
Pages to print
Enter page numbers and/or page ranges separated by commas. For example, 1,3,5-12.
After downloading, print the document using a PDF reader (e.g. Adobe Reader).
View images
View plain text
<br />505 U.S. 1003 <br /> <br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL <br />Cite 88112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) <br /> <br />2887 <br /> <br />regulation without requirement of compensa- <br />tion to decide case in which property owner <br />alleged that all economically viable use of his <br />property was precluded by. South Carolina <br />Beachfront Management Act, which barred <br />him from erecting any permanent habitable <br />structures on his land; in order to avoid <br />paying compensation, state had to identify <br />background principles of nuisance and prop- <br />erty law that prohibited use as landowner <br />presently intended in circumstances in which <br />property was presently found. U.S.C.A. <br />Const.Amend. 5. <br /> <br />7. Eminent Domain e:>69 <br /> <br />Where state seeks to sustain regulation <br />that deprives land of all economically benefi- <br />cial use, it may resist compensation only if <br />logically antecedent inquiry into nature of <br />owner's estate shows that proscnbed use in- <br />terests were not part of his title to begin <br />with.. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. <br /> <br />8. Eminent Domain e:>69 <br /> <br />In <<;>rder for state regulations prohibiting <br />all economically beneficial use of land to be <br />imposed without necessity of paying compen- <br />sation to landowners, regulation must do no <br />more than duplicate result that could have <br />been achieved in the courts by adjacent land- <br />owners or other uniquely affected persons <br />under state's law of private nuisance, or by <br />state under its complimentary power to abate <br />nuisances that affect public generally, or oth- <br />erwise. U.S.C.A. Const.Amend. 5. <br /> <br />9. Eminent Domain e:>llU <br /> <br />Although state may elect to rescind reg- <br />ulation which prohibits all economically bene- <br />ficial use of land, and thereby avoid having to <br />pay compensation for permanent deprivation <br />of land, where regulation has already worked <br />a taking of all use of property, no subsequent <br />action by government can relieve it of duty to <br />provide compensation for period during <br />which taking was effective. U.S.CA Const. <br />Amend. 5. <br /> <br />· The syllabus constitutes no part of the opinion of <br />the Court but has been prepared by the Reporter <br />of Decisions for the convenience of the reader. <br /> <br />Syllabus · <br /> <br />In 1986, petitioner Lucas bought two <br />residential lots on a South Carolina bamer <br />island, intending to build single-farilily homes <br />such as those on the immediately adjacent <br />parcels. At that time, Lucas's lots were not <br />subject to the State's coastal zone building <br />permit requirements. In 1988, however, the <br />state legislature enacted the Beachfront <br />Management Act, which barred Lucas from <br />erecting any permanent habitable structures <br />on his parcels. He filed suit against respon- <br />dent state agency, contending that, . even <br />though the Act may have been a lawful exer- <br />cise of the State's police power, the ban on <br />construction deprived him of all "economical- <br />ly viable use" of his property and therefore <br />effected a "taking" under the Fifth and Four- <br />teenth Amendments that required the pay- <br />ment of just compensation. See, e.g., Agins <br />v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.s. 255, 261, 100 <br />S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106. The state <br />trial court agreed, finding that the ban ren- <br />dered Lucas's parcels "valueless," and e~-: <br />tered an award exceeding $1.2 million.. In <br />reversing, the State Supreme Court held it- <br />self bound, in light of Lucas's failure. to . at- <br />tack the Act's validity, to accept the legisla- <br />ture's "uncontested .., findings" that new <br />construction in the coastal zone threatened a <br />valuable public resource. The court ruled <br />that, under the Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. <br />623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205, line of cases, <br />when a regulation is designed to prevent <br />"harmful or noxious uses" of property akin to <br />public nuisances, no compensation is owing <br />under the Takings Clause regardless of the <br />regulation's effect on the property's value. <br /> <br />Held: <br /> <br />1. Lucas's takings claim is not. ren- <br />dered unripe by the fact that he may yet be <br />able to secure a special permit to build on <br />his property under an amendment to the Act <br />passed after briefing and argument before <br /> <br />See United States v. Detroit Lumber Co., 200 U.S. <br />321,337,26 S.Ct. 282, 287, 50 L.Ed. 499. <br />
The URL can be used to link to this page
Your browser does not support the video tag.