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<br />505 U.S. 1016
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA .COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2893
<br />
<br />cation under the police power, "the natural'
<br />tendency of human nature [would be] to ex-
<br />tend the qualification more and more until at
<br />last private property disappear[ed)." Id., at
<br />415, 43 S.Ct., at 160. These considerations
<br />gave birth in that case to the oft-cited maxim
<br />that, "while property may be regulated to a
<br />certain extent, if regulation goes too far it
<br />will be recognized as a taking." Ibid.
<br />
<br />[2] ..lJglsN evertheless, oUr decision in M a-
<br />hon offered little insight into when, and un-
<br />der what circumstances, a given regulation
<br />would be seen as going "too far" for purposes
<br />of the Fifth Amendment. In 70-0dd years of
<br />succeeding "regulatory takings" jurispru-
<br />dence, we have generally eschewed any " 'set
<br />formula' " for determining how far is too far,
<br />preferring to "engag[e] in . ~. essentially ad
<br />hoc, factual inquiries." Penn.Central Trans-
<br />porUJiicn Co. 11. New York city, 438 U.S. 104,
<br />124, 98 S.Ct.. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631
<br />(1978) (quoting Goldblatt 11. Hempstead, 369
<br />U.S. 590, 594, 828.Ct. 987, 990, 8 L.Ed.2d
<br />130 (1962)). See Epstein, Tiilings: Descent
<br />and Resurrection, 1987 S.Ct. Rev. 1, 4. We
<br />have, however, described at least two dis-
<br />crete categories of regulatory action as com-
<br />pensable . wiUiout case-specific inquiry into
<br />the public interest advanced in support of the
<br />restraint. The first encompasses regulations
<br />that compel the property owner to suffer a
<br />physical "invasion" of his property. In gen-
<br />eral (at least with regard to permanent inva-
<br />sions), no matter how minute the intrusion,
<br />
<br />6. We will not attempt to respond to all of Justice
<br />BLACKMUN's mistaken citation of case prece.
<br />dent. Chanicteristic of its nature is his assertion
<br />that the cases we discuss here stand merely for
<br />the proposition "that proof that a regulation does
<br />not deny an owner economic uSe of his property
<br />is sufficient to defeat a facial takings challenge"
<br />and not for the point that "denial of such use is
<br />sufficient to establish a takings claim regardless .
<br />of any other consideration." Post, at 2911. n. 11.
<br />The cases say, repeatedly and unmistakably, that
<br />" '[t]he test to be applied in considering [a] facial
<br />[takings] challenge is fairly straightforWard. A
<br />statute -regulating the uses that can be made of
<br />property effects a taking if it "denies an owner
<br />economically viable use of his land."'" Key.
<br />stone, 480 U.S., at 495, 107 S.Ct.. at 1247 (quot-
<br />
<br />and no matter how weighty the public pur-
<br />pose behind it, we have required compensa-
<br />tion. For example, in Loretto 11. Tele.
<br />prompter Manhattan CATV Corp., 458 U.S.
<br />419, 102 S.Ct. 3164, 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982),
<br />we determined that New York's law requir-
<br />ing landlords to allow television cable compa-
<br />nies to emplace cable facilities in their apart-
<br />ment buildings constituted a taking, id., at
<br />435-440,102 S.Ct., at 3175-3178, even though
<br />the facilities occupied at most only H~ cubic
<br />feet of the landlords' property, see id., at 438,
<br />n. 16, 102 S.Ct., at 3177. See also United
<br />States 11. Causby, 328 U.S. 256, 265, and n.
<br />10,66 8.Ct. 1062, 1067, and n. 10, 90 L.Ed.
<br />1206 (1946) (physical invasions of airspace);
<br />cr. KaiBer Aetna 11. United States, 444 U.S.
<br />164, 100 S.Ct. 383, 62 L.Ed.2d 332 (1979)
<br />(imposition of navigational servitude upon
<br />private marina).
<br />
<br />The second situation in wlY,~ we have
<br />found categorical treatment appropriate is
<br />where regulation denies all economically ben-
<br />eficial or productive use of land. See Agins,
<br />447 U.S., at 260, 100 S.Ct.,at 2141; see also
<br />Nollan 11. California Coastal Comm'n., 483
<br />U.S. 825, 834, 107 S.Ct. 3141, 3147, 97
<br />L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); Keystone Bituminous
<br />Coal As8n. 11. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470,
<br />495, 107 S.Ct. 1232, 1247, 94 L.Ed.2d 472
<br />(1987); Hodel 11. Virginia Surface Mining &
<br />Reclamaticn As8n., Inc., 452...IJg16U.S. 264,
<br />295-296, 101 S.Ct. 2352, 2370, 69 L.Ed.2d 1
<br />(1981).6 As we have said on numerous occa-
<br />
<br />ing Hodel, 452 U.S., at 295":296, 101 S.Ct., at
<br />2370 (quoting Agins, 447 U.S., at 260, 100 S.Ct.,
<br />at 2141)) (emphasis added).
<br />
<br />Justice BLACKMUN describes that rule (which
<br />we do not invent but merely apply today) as
<br />"a1ter[ing] the long.settled rules of review" by
<br />foisting on the State "the burden of showing [its]
<br />regulation is not a taking." Post, at 2909. This
<br />is of course wrong. Lucas had to do more than
<br />simply file a lawsuit to establish his constitution.
<br />al entitlement; he had to show that the Beach-
<br />front Management Act denied him economically
<br />beneficial use of his land. Our analysis pre.
<br />sumes the unconstitutionality of state land.use
<br />; regulation only in the sense that any rule with
<br />exceptions presumes the invalidity of a law that
<br />
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