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<br />505 U.s. 1019
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2895
<br />
<br />cally, as here, by requiring land to be left
<br />substantially in its natural state-carry with
<br />them a heightened risk that private property
<br />is being pressed into some form of public
<br />service under the guise of mitigating serious
<br />public harm. See, e.g., Annicelli v. South
<br />Kingstown, 463 A2d 133, 140-141 (R.I.1983)
<br />(prohibition on construction adjacent to
<br />beach justified on twin grounds of safety and
<br />"conservation of open space"); Morris Coun-
<br />ty Land Improvement Co. v. Parsippany-
<br />Troy Hills Township, 40 N.J. 539, 552-053,
<br />193 A2d 232, 240 (1963) (prohibition' on fill-
<br />ing marshlands imposed in order to preserve
<br />region as. water detention basin and create
<br />wildlife refuge). As Justice Brennan ex-
<br />plained: "From the government's point of
<br />view, the benefits flowing to the public from
<br />preservation of open space through regula-
<br />tion may be equally great as from creating a
<br />wildlife refuge through formal condemnation
<br />or increasing electricity production through a
<br />dam project that floods private property."
<br />San Diego Gas & Elec. Co., supra, 450 U.S.,
<br />at 652, 101 S.Ct.,at 1304 (dissenting opinion).
<br />The many statutes on the books, both state
<br />and federal, that!J919provide for the use of
<br />eminent domain to impose servitudes on pri-
<br />
<br />8. Justice STEVENS criticizes the "deprivation of
<br />all economically beneficial use" rule as "wholly
<br />arbitrary," in that "[the] landowner whose prop-
<br />erty is diminished in value 95% recovers noth-
<br />iitg," while the landowner who suffers a com-
<br />plete elimination of value "recovers the land's
<br />full value." Post, at 2919. This analysis errs in
<br />its assumption that the landowner whose depri-
<br />vation is one step short of complet~ is not enti-
<br />tled to compensation. Such an owner might not
<br />be able to claim the benefit of our categorical
<br />formulation, but, as we have acknowledged time
<br />and again, "[t]he economic impact of the regula-
<br />tion on the claimant and ;.. the extent to which
<br />the regulation has interfered with distinct invest-
<br />ment-backed expectations" are keenly relevant to
<br />. takings analysis generally. Penn Central Trans-
<br />portation Co. v. New York City, 438 U.S; 104, 124,
<br />98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 (1978). Itis
<br />true that in at least some cases the landowner
<br />with 95% loss will get nothing, while the land-
<br />owner with total loss will recover in full. But
<br />that occasional result is no more strange than the
<br />
<br />vate scenic lands prev~nting developmental
<br />uses, or to acquire such lands altogether,
<br />suggest the practical equivalence in this set-
<br />ting of negative regulation anq appropriation.
<br />See, e.g., 16 U.S.C. ~ 41Off-l(a) (authorizing
<br />acquisition of "lands, waters, or interests
<br />[within Channel Islands National Park] (in-
<br />cluding but not limited to scenic ease-
<br />ments)"); ~ 460aa...,2(a) (authorizing acquisi-
<br />tion of "any land!!, or lesser interests therein,
<br />including mineral interests and . scenic ease-
<br />ments" within .Sawtooth National Recreation
<br />Area); ~.~ 3921-8923 (authorizing acquisition
<br />of wetlands); N.C. Gen.Stat. .~ 113A-38
<br />(1990) (authorizing acquisition of, inter alia,
<br />"'scenic easements'''. within the North Car-
<br />olina natural and seenic rivers system);
<br />Tenn.Code Ann. U 11-15-101 to 11-15-108
<br />(1987) (authorizing acquisitiono( "protective
<br />easements" and other rights. in real property
<br />adjacent to state's historic, architectural, ar-
<br />chaeological, or cultural resources).
<br />
<br />[3,4] We think, in short, that there are
<br />good reasQns for our frequently expressed
<br />belief that when the owner of real property
<br />has been called upon to sacrifice all economi-
<br />cally beneficial uses in the name of the com-
<br />mon good, that is, to leave his property eco-
<br />nomically idle, he has sUffered a taking.8
<br />
<br />gross disparity between the landowner whose
<br />premises are taken for a highway (who recovers
<br />in full) and the landowner whose property is
<br />reduced to 5% of its former value by the highway
<br />(who recovers' nothing). Takings law is full of
<br />these "all-or-nothing" situations.
<br />
<br />Justice STEVENS similarly misinterprets our
<br />focus on "developmental" \.\Ses of property (the
<br />uses proscribed by the Beachfront. Management
<br />Act) as betraying an "assumption that the only
<br />uses of property cognizable under the Constitu-
<br />tion are developmental uses." Post, at 2919. n. 3.
<br />We make no such assumption. Though our prior
<br />takings cases evince an abiding concern for the
<br />productive 1,ISe of, and economic investment in,
<br />land, there are plainly a number of noneconomic
<br />interests in land whose impairment will invite
<br />exceedingly close scrutiny under the Takings
<br />Clause. See, e.g., Loretto v. Teleprompter Man-
<br />hattan CATV Co,p., 458 U.S. 419, 436, 102 S.Ct.
<br />3164, 3176. 73 L.Ed.2d 868 (1982) (iriterest in
<br />excluding strangers from one's land).
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