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<br />505 U.S. 1024
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2897
<br />
<br />Due Process and Takings Clause challenges
<br />the State's use of its "police powers" to en-
<br />join a property owner from activities akin to
<br />public nuisances. See Mugler v. Kansas, 123
<br />U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 t.Ed. 205 (1887)
<br />(law prohibiting manufacture of alcoholic
<br />beverages); Hadacheck v. Sebastia:n, 239
<br />U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915)
<br />(law baITing operation of brick mill in resi-
<br />dential area); MiUer v. Schoene, 276 U.S.
<br />272, 48 S.Ct. 246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928) (order
<br />to destroy diseased cedar trees to prevent
<br />infection of. nearby orchards); Goldhlatt v.
<br />Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 8.Ct, 987, 8
<br />L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (law effectively prevent-
<br />ing continued operation of quarry in residen-
<br />tial area). .
<br />
<br />ments"). We made this very point in Penn
<br />Central Transportation Co., where, in the
<br />course of sustaining New York City's land-
<br />marks preservation program. against a tak-
<br />ings challenge, we rejected the petitioner's
<br />suggestion that Mugler and the. cases follow-
<br />ing it were premised on, and th\1S limited by,
<br />some objective conception of ''noxiousness'':
<br />
<br />"[T]he uses in issue in Hadacheck, Miller,
<br />and Goldblatt were perfectly lawful in
<br />themselves. They involved no 'blamewor-
<br />thiness, ... moral wrongdoing or con-
<br />scious act of dangerous risk-taking which
<br />induce[d society] to shift the cost to a
<br />pa[rt]icular individual~' Sax, Takings and
<br />the Police Power, 74 Yale L.J. 36, 50
<br />(1964). These cases are better understood
<br />as resting not on any supposed 'noxious'
<br />quality of the prohibited useS but rather on
<br />the ground that the restrictions were rea-
<br />sonably reiated to the implementation of a
<br />policy-not unlike historic preservation-
<br />. expected to produce a widespread public
<br />benefit and applicable to all similarly situ-
<br />ated property." 438 U.S., at 133-134, n.
<br />30, 98 S.Ct., at 2664, n. 30.
<br />
<br />It is correct that many of our prior opin-
<br />ions have suggested that "harmful or noxious
<br />uses" of property may be proscribed by gov-
<br />ernment regulation without the requirement
<br />of compensation. For a number of reasons,
<br />however, we think the .south Oarolina Su-
<br />preme Court was too quick to conclude that
<br />that principle decides the present case. The
<br />"harmful or noxious uses" principle was the
<br />Oourt's early attempt to describe in theoreti- "Harmful or noxious use" analysis was, in
<br />cal terms why governmen~may, consis- other. words, simply the progenitor of our
<br />tent with the Takings Clause, affect property mo~~ contempo~. statements that
<br />vall,les by regulation without incuning an ~ !~d-~se regul~tion does not effec~ ~ tak-
<br />obligation to compensate-a reality we nowa- mg if. ~t subs~ti~~y advance[s] legItimate
<br />days acknowledge explicitly with respect to state mterests.... N ollan, supra, ~
<br />the . full scope of the State's police power. U.S., at 834, 107 S.Ct., at 3147 (quoting
<br />See, e.g., Penn Central Transportation Co., Agins v. Tiburon, 447 U.S., at 260,100 S.Ct"
<br />438 U.S., at 125, 98 8.0t., at 2659 (where at 2141); see also Penn Central Transporta-
<br />State "reasonably conclude[s] that. 'the tionCo., 8U~ 438 U.S., at 127, 98 S.0t., at
<br />. al . , 2660; Euclld 11. Ambler Realty Co., 272 U.8.
<br />health, safety, morals, or g~er w~lfare 365 387-888 478.Ot. 114 118 71 L.Ed. 303
<br />would be promoted by prolublting particular (1926)' "
<br />contemplated uses of land," compensation .
<br />need not accompany prohibition); see also The. transition from our early focus on
<br />Nollan 11. California Coastal Comm'n, 483 control of "noxious" uses to our contempo-
<br />U.S., at 834-835, 107 8.0t., at 3147 ("Our rary understanding of the broad realm within
<br />cases have not elabol'ated on the standards which government may regulate without
<br />for determining what constitutes a 'legitimate compensation was ail easy one, since the
<br />state interest[,]' [but] [t]hey have made clear distinction between "harm-preventing" and
<br />. .. that a broad range of governmental pur- "benefit-conferring" regulation is often in the
<br />poses and regulations satisfy these require- eye of the beholder. It is quite possible, for
<br />
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