Item B: Ordinance Concerning Goal 5 Natural Resources Study

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505 U.S. 1028 LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL Cite as 112 S.CI. 2886 (1992) 2899 regulatory diminution in value; and that the distinction between regulation that "prevents harmful use" and that which "confers' bene- fits" is difficult, if not impossible, to discern on an objective, value-free basis; it becomes self-evident that noxious-use logic cannot serve as a touchstone to distinguish regulato- ry "takings"-which require compensation~ from regulatory deprivations that do not re- quire compensation. A fortWri the legisla- ture's recitation of a noxious-use justification cannot be the baSis for departing from our categorical rule that total regulatory takings must be compensated. If it were, departure would virtually always be allowed. The South Carolina Supreme Court's approach would essentially nullify Malum:s affirmation of limits to the noncompensable exercise of the police power. Our cases provide no sup- port for this: None of them that employed the logic of "harmful use" prevention to sus- tain a regulation involved an allegation that the regulation wholly eliminated the value of the claimant's land. See Keystone Bitumi- nous Coal Assn., 480 U.S., at 513-514, 107 S.Ct., at 1257 (REHNQUIST, C.J., dissent- ihg).13 [7] ..JJgzrWhere the State seeks to sustain regulation that deprives land of all economi- 13. E.g., Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Rd. 205 (1887) (prohibition upon use of a building as a brewery; other uses permit- ted); Plymouth Coal CO. V,, Pennsylvania, 232 U.S. 531, 34 S.Ct. 359, 58 L.Ed. 713 (1914) (requirement that "pillar" of. coal be left in ground to safeguard mine workers; mineral rights could otheIWise be exploited); Reinman v. J;.ittle Rock, 237 U.S. 171, 35 S.Ct. 511, 59 L.Ed. 900 (1915) (declaration that livery stable consti- tuted a public nuisance; other uses of the' prop- erty permitted); Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915) (prohibition of brick manufacturing in residential area; other uses permitted); Goldblatt v. Hemp- stead, 369 U.S. 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962) (prohibition on excavation; other uses permitted). 14. Drawing on our First Amendment jurispru- dence, see, e.g., Employment Div.; Dept. of Hu- man Resources of Ore. v. Smith, 494 U.S. 872, 878-879, 110 S.Ct. 1595, 1600, 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990), Justice STEVENS would "loo[k] to the cally beneficial use, we think it may resist compensation only if the logically antecedent inquiry into' the nature of the oWIier's estate shows that the proscribed use interests were not part of his title to begin with.14 This accords, we think, with our "takings" juris- prudence, which has traditionally been guid- ed by the understandings of our citizens re- garding the content of, and the State's power over, the "bundle of rights" that they acquire when they obtain title to property. It seems to us that the property owner necessarily expects the uses of his property to be re- stricted, from time to time, by various mea- sures newly enacted by the State in legiti- mate exercise of its police powers; "[aJs long recognized, some values are. enjoyed under an implied limitation and must yield to the police power.'" Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S., at 413, 43 S.Ct., at 159. And in the, case of personal property, by reason of the State's traditionally high de- gree of control over commerciaI dealings, he ought to be aware of the possibility that new regulation might even ~rl028 his proPerty economically worthless (at least if the prop- erty's only economically productive use is sale or manufacture for sale). See Andrus v. Allard, 444 U.S. 51, 66-67, 100 S.Ct. 318, generality of a regulation of property" to deter- mine whether compensation is owing. Post, at 2923. The Beachfront Management Act is gener- al, in his view, because it "regulates the use of the coastline of the, entire Stlite." Post, at 2924. There may be some Validity to the principle Jus- tice STEVENS proposes, but it does not properly apply to the present case. The equivalent of a law of general application that inhibits the prac- tice of religion without being aimed' at religion, see Oregon v. Smith, supra, is a law that destroys the value of land without being aimed at land. Perhaps such a law-the generally applicable criminal prohibition on the manufacturing of al- coholic beverages challenged in Mugler comes to mind-cannot constitute a compensable taking. See 123 U.S., at 655-656, 8 S.Ct., at 293-294. But a regulation specifically directed to land use no more acquires immunity by plundering land- owners generally than does a law specifically directed at religious practice acquire itnrtlUnity 'by prohibiting all religions. Justice STEVENS's approach renders the Takings Clause little more than a particularized restatement of the Equal Protection Clause.