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<br />505 Us. 1035
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2903
<br />
<br />with relevant' administrative requirements the propertY' of all value; the test must be
<br />will, be part of that analysis. whether the deprivation is contrary to rea-
<br />sonable, investment-backed expectations.
<br />
<br />The South Carolina Court of' Common
<br />Pleas found that petitioner's real property There is an inherent tendency towards cir~
<br />has been rendered valueless by the State's cularity in this synthesis, of course; for if the
<br />regulation. App. to Pet. for Cert. 37. The owner's reasonable expectations are shaped
<br />finding appears to presume that the property by what courts allow as a proper exercise of
<br />has no significant ~t1()84 value or resale governmental authority, property tends to
<br />potential: This is a curious finding, and I become what courts say it is. Some circular-
<br />share the reservations of some of my col- ity must be tolerated in these matters, how-
<br />leagues about a finding that a: beach-front lot ever, as it is in other spheres. E.g., Katz v.
<br />loses all value because of a development re- ..h,0S5United States, 389 U.S. 347, 88 S.Ct. 507,
<br />striction. Post, at 2908 (BLACKMUN, J., 19 L.Ed.2d 576 (1967) (Fourth Amendment
<br />dissenting); post, at 2919, n. 3 (STEVENS, protections defined by reasonable expecta~
<br />J., dissenting); post, at 2925 (statement of tions of privacy), The definition, moreover,
<br />SOUTER. J.). While the Supreme Court of is not circular in its entirety., The expecta-
<br />Soath Carolina on remand need not consider tions protected by the Constitution are based
<br />the case subject to this constraint, we must on objective rules and customs that can be
<br />accept the finding as entered below. See understood as reasonable by all parties, in-
<br />Oklahoma City v. Tuttle, 471 U.S. 808, 816, volved.
<br />105 S.Ct. 2427, 2432, 85 L.Ed.2d 791 (1985).
<br />Accepting the finding as entered, it fallows
<br />that petitioner is entitled to invoke the line of
<br />cases discussing regulations that deprive real
<br />property of all economic value. See Agins v.
<br />City of Tibu1'O'rl. 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 S.Ct.
<br />2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980).
<br />
<br />The finding of no value must be considered
<br />under the Takings Clause by reference to the
<br />owner's reasonable, investment-backed ex-
<br />pectations. Kaiser Aetna v. United States,
<br />444 U.S. 164, 175, 100 S.Ct. 383, 390, 62
<br />L.Ed.2d 332 (1979); Penn Central Transpor-
<br />tation Co. 'U. New York City, 438 U.S. 104,
<br />124, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2659. 57 L.Ed.2d 631
<br />(1978);' see also W.B. Worthen Co. v. Kava-
<br />naugh. '295 U.S" 56, 55 S.Ct. 555, 79 L.Ed.
<br />1298 (1935). The TalrlDgs Clause, while con-
<br />ferring substantial protection on property
<br />owners, does not eliminate the police power
<br />of the State to enact limitations on the use of
<br />their property. Mugter v. Kansas, 123 u.s.
<br />623, 669, 8 S.Ct. 273, 301, 31 L.Ed. 205
<br />(1887). The rights conferred by the Takings
<br />Clause and the police power of the State may
<br />coexist without conflict.: Property is bought
<br />and sold, investments are made, subject to
<br />the State's power to reguiate. Where a tak-
<br />ing is alleged from regulations which deprive
<br />
<br />In my view, reasonable expectations must
<br />be understood in light of the whole of our
<br />legal tradition. The common law of nuisance
<br />is too natTOw a confine for the exercise of
<br />regulatory power in a complex and. interde-
<br />pendent . society. Goldblatt v. Hempstead,
<br />369 U.S. 590, 593, 82 S.Ct. 987, 989, 8
<br />L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). The State should not be
<br />prevented from enacting new regulatory ini-
<br />tiatives in response to changing conditions,
<br />and courts must consider all reasonable ex-
<br />pectations whatever their source. The Tak-
<br />ings Clause does not require a static body of
<br />state property laW; it protects private expec-
<br />tations to ensure private investment. I
<br />agree with the Court that nuisance preven-
<br />. tion accords with the most common expecta-
<br />tions of property owners who face regulation,
<br />but I do not believe this can be the sole
<br />source of state authority to impose severe
<br />restrictions. Coastal property may present
<br />such unique concerns for a fragile land sys-
<br />tem that the State can go further in regulat-
<br />ing its development and use than the. com-
<br />mon'law of nuisanc~ might otherwise permit.
<br />
<br />The Supreme Court of South Carolina
<br />erred, in my view, by reciting the general
<br />purposes for which the state regulations
<br />
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