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<br />505 U.S. 1054
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2913
<br />
<br />turns on whether the prohibited activity is a
<br />common-law nuisance.11 The brewery closed
<br />in Mugler itself was not a common-law nui-
<br />sance, and the Court specifically stated that
<br />it was the rqle of the legislature to de-
<br />~nel053 what measures would be appro-
<br />priate for the protection of public health and
<br />safety. See 123 U.S., at 661, 8 S.Ct.," at 297.
<br />In upholding the state action in Miller, the
<br />Court found it unnecessary to ''weigh with
<br />nicety the question whether the infected ce-
<br />dars constitute a nuisance according to com-
<br />mon law; or whether they may be so de-
<br />clared by statute." 276 U.S., at 280; 48 S.Ct.,
<br />at 248. See also Goldblatt, 369 U.S., at 593,
<br />82 S.Ct., at 989; Hadacheck, 239 U.S., at 411,
<br />36 S.Ct., at 146. Instead the Court has
<br />relied "in the past, as the South Carolina
<br />court has done here, on legislative judgments
<br />of what constitutes a harm.17
<br />
<br />The Court rejects the notion that the State
<br />always can prohibit uses it deems a harm to
<br />the public without granting compensation be-
<br />cause ''the distiJiction between 'harm-pre-
<br />venting' and 'benefit-confeiTing' regulation is
<br />often in the eye of the beholder." Ante, at
<br />2897. Since the characterization will depend
<br />"primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth
<br />of competing uses of real estate," ante, at
<br />
<br />16. Also, until today the fact that the regulation
<br />prohibited uses that were lawful at the time the
<br />owner purchased did not determine the constitu-
<br />tional question. The brewery, the brickyard, the
<br />cedar trees, and the gravel pit were all perfectly
<br />legitimate uses prior to the passage of the regula-
<br />tion. See MugleT v. Kansas, 123 U.S., at 654," 8
<br />S.Ct., at 293; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S.
<br />394,36 S.Ct. 143,60 L.Ed. 348 (1915); Miller,
<br />276 U.S., at 272, 48 S.Ct., at 246; Goldblatt v.
<br />Hempstead, 369 U.S." 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8
<br />L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). This Court explicitly ac-
<br />knowledged in Hadacheck that "[a] vested inter-
<br />est cannot be asserted against [the police power]
<br />because of conditions once obtaining. To so
<br />hold would preclude development and fix a city
<br />forever in its primitive conditions." 239 U.S;, at
<br />410,36 S.Ct., at 145 (citation omitted).
<br />
<br />17. The Court argues thilt finding no taking when
<br />the legislature prohibits a harmful use, such as
<br />the Court did in Mugler and the South Carolina
<br />Supreme Court did in the instant case, would
<br />nullify Pennsylvania Coal. See ante, at 2897.
<br />
<br />2898; the Court decides a legislative judg-
<br />mentof this kind no longer can provide the
<br />desired "objective, value-free basis" for up-
<br />holding a regulation, ante, at 2899. The
<br />Court, however, fails to explain how its pro-
<br />posed common-law alternative escapes the
<br />same trap.
<br />
<br />.l1.054The threshold inquiry for imposition of
<br />the Court's new rule, "deprivation of all eco-
<br />nomically valuable use," itself cannot be de-
<br />termined objectively. " As the Court admits,
<br />whether the owner has been deprived of all
<br />economic value of his property will depend on
<br />how "property" is defined. The "composition
<br />of the denominator in our 'deprivation' frac-
<br />tion," ante, at "2894, n. 7, is the dispositive
<br />inquiry. Yet there is no "objective" way:to
<br />define what that denominator should "be.
<br />"We have long understood that any land-use
<br />regulation can be characterized as the 'total'.
<br />deprivation of an aptly defined entitle-
<br />ment. ... Alternatively, the slpne regulati.on
<br />can always be characterized as a mere 'par-
<br />tial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered
<br />ownership of the landholding affected by the
<br />regulation. . . ." 18 Michelman, Takings,
<br />1987, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1600, 1614 (1988).
<br />
<br />The Court's decision in Keystone Bitumi-
<br />nous Coal illustrates this principle perfectly.
<br />
<br />Justice Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Coal,
<br />joined Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272; 48 S.Ct.
<br />246. 7'/. 1.Ed. 568 (1928), six years later. In
<br />Miller, the Court adopted the exact approach of
<br />the South Carolina court: It found the cedar
<br />trees harmful, "and their destruction not a taking,
<br />whether or not they were a nuisance. Justice
<br />Holmes apparently believed that such anap-
<br />proach did not repudiate his earlier opinion.
<br />Moreover," this Court already has been over this
<br />ground five years ago. and at that pQint rejected
<br />the assertion that Pennsylvania Coal was incon-
<br />sistent with Mugler; Hadacheck, Miller, or the
<br />others in the string of "noxious use" cases.
<br />recognizing instead tbat the nature of the State's
<br />action is critical in taki\1gs," imalysis. Keystone
<br />Bituminous Coal, 480 U.s., at 490, 107 'S.Ct., "at
<br />1244." "
<br />
<br />18. See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and
<br />Fairness, Comments on the Ethic"al Foundations
<br />of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev.
<br />1165, 1192-1193 (1967); Sax, Takings and the
<br />Police Power, 74 Yale 1.J. 36, 60 (1964).
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