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<br />505 U.S. 1054 <br /> <br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL <br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) <br /> <br />2913 <br /> <br />turns on whether the prohibited activity is a <br />common-law nuisance.11 The brewery closed <br />in Mugler itself was not a common-law nui- <br />sance, and the Court specifically stated that <br />it was the rqle of the legislature to de- <br />~nel053 what measures would be appro- <br />priate for the protection of public health and <br />safety. See 123 U.S., at 661, 8 S.Ct.," at 297. <br />In upholding the state action in Miller, the <br />Court found it unnecessary to ''weigh with <br />nicety the question whether the infected ce- <br />dars constitute a nuisance according to com- <br />mon law; or whether they may be so de- <br />clared by statute." 276 U.S., at 280; 48 S.Ct., <br />at 248. See also Goldblatt, 369 U.S., at 593, <br />82 S.Ct., at 989; Hadacheck, 239 U.S., at 411, <br />36 S.Ct., at 146. Instead the Court has <br />relied "in the past, as the South Carolina <br />court has done here, on legislative judgments <br />of what constitutes a harm.17 <br /> <br />The Court rejects the notion that the State <br />always can prohibit uses it deems a harm to <br />the public without granting compensation be- <br />cause ''the distiJiction between 'harm-pre- <br />venting' and 'benefit-confeiTing' regulation is <br />often in the eye of the beholder." Ante, at <br />2897. Since the characterization will depend <br />"primarily upon one's evaluation of the worth <br />of competing uses of real estate," ante, at <br /> <br />16. Also, until today the fact that the regulation <br />prohibited uses that were lawful at the time the <br />owner purchased did not determine the constitu- <br />tional question. The brewery, the brickyard, the <br />cedar trees, and the gravel pit were all perfectly <br />legitimate uses prior to the passage of the regula- <br />tion. See MugleT v. Kansas, 123 U.S., at 654," 8 <br />S.Ct., at 293; Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. <br />394,36 S.Ct. 143,60 L.Ed. 348 (1915); Miller, <br />276 U.S., at 272, 48 S.Ct., at 246; Goldblatt v. <br />Hempstead, 369 U.S." 590, 82 S.Ct. 987, 8 <br />L.Ed.2d 130 (1962). This Court explicitly ac- <br />knowledged in Hadacheck that "[a] vested inter- <br />est cannot be asserted against [the police power] <br />because of conditions once obtaining. To so <br />hold would preclude development and fix a city <br />forever in its primitive conditions." 239 U.S;, at <br />410,36 S.Ct., at 145 (citation omitted). <br /> <br />17. The Court argues thilt finding no taking when <br />the legislature prohibits a harmful use, such as <br />the Court did in Mugler and the South Carolina <br />Supreme Court did in the instant case, would <br />nullify Pennsylvania Coal. See ante, at 2897. <br /> <br />2898; the Court decides a legislative judg- <br />mentof this kind no longer can provide the <br />desired "objective, value-free basis" for up- <br />holding a regulation, ante, at 2899. The <br />Court, however, fails to explain how its pro- <br />posed common-law alternative escapes the <br />same trap. <br /> <br />.l1.054The threshold inquiry for imposition of <br />the Court's new rule, "deprivation of all eco- <br />nomically valuable use," itself cannot be de- <br />termined objectively. " As the Court admits, <br />whether the owner has been deprived of all <br />economic value of his property will depend on <br />how "property" is defined. The "composition <br />of the denominator in our 'deprivation' frac- <br />tion," ante, at "2894, n. 7, is the dispositive <br />inquiry. Yet there is no "objective" way:to <br />define what that denominator should "be. <br />"We have long understood that any land-use <br />regulation can be characterized as the 'total'. <br />deprivation of an aptly defined entitle- <br />ment. ... Alternatively, the slpne regulati.on <br />can always be characterized as a mere 'par- <br />tial' withdrawal from full, unencumbered <br />ownership of the landholding affected by the <br />regulation. . . ." 18 Michelman, Takings, <br />1987, 88 Colum.L.Rev. 1600, 1614 (1988). <br /> <br />The Court's decision in Keystone Bitumi- <br />nous Coal illustrates this principle perfectly. <br /> <br />Justice Holmes, the author of Pennsylvania Coal, <br />joined Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272; 48 S.Ct. <br />246. 7'/. 1.Ed. 568 (1928), six years later. In <br />Miller, the Court adopted the exact approach of <br />the South Carolina court: It found the cedar <br />trees harmful, "and their destruction not a taking, <br />whether or not they were a nuisance. Justice <br />Holmes apparently believed that such anap- <br />proach did not repudiate his earlier opinion. <br />Moreover," this Court already has been over this <br />ground five years ago. and at that pQint rejected <br />the assertion that Pennsylvania Coal was incon- <br />sistent with Mugler; Hadacheck, Miller, or the <br />others in the string of "noxious use" cases. <br />recognizing instead tbat the nature of the State's <br />action is critical in taki\1gs," imalysis. Keystone <br />Bituminous Coal, 480 U.s., at 490, 107 'S.Ct., "at <br />1244." " <br /> <br />18. See also Michelman, Property, Utility, and <br />Fairness, Comments on the Ethic"al Foundations <br />of "Just Compensation" Law, 80 Harv.L.Rev. <br />1165, 1192-1193 (1967); Sax, Takings and the <br />Police Power, 74 Yale 1.J. 36, 60 (1964). <br />