|
<br />505 U.S. 1073
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2923
<br />
<br />analysis: the character of the regulatory ac-
<br />tion.
<br />
<br />The Just Compensation Clause "was de-
<br />signed to bar Government from forcing some
<br />people alone to bear public burdens which, in
<br />all fairn8lls and justice, should be borne by
<br />.the public as a whole." Armstrong, 364 U.S.,
<br />at 49, 80 S.Ct., at 1569. Accordingly, one of
<br />the central concerns of our takings jurispru-
<br />dence is "prevent[ing] the public from load-
<br />ing upon one individual more than his just
<br />share of the burdens of government." Mo-
<br />nongahela Navigation Co. v. United
<br />.JJ.owS'tates, 148 U.S.' 312, 325, 13 S.Ct. 622,
<br />626, 37 L.Ed. 463 (1893). We have,there-
<br />fore, in our takings law frequently looked to
<br />the generaltty of a regulation of property.7
<br />
<br />For example, in the case of so-called "de-
<br />velopmental exactions," we have paid special
<br />attention to the risk that particular landown-
<br />ers might "b[e] singled out to bear the bur-
<br />den" of a broader problem not of his own
<br />making. NoUan, 483 U.S., at 835, n. 4,107
<br />S.Ct., at 3148, n. 4; see also PenneU 'IJ. San
<br />Jose, 485 U.S. 1, 23, 108 S.Ct. 849, 863, 99
<br />L.Ed.2d 1 (1988). Similarly, in distinguish-
<br />ing between the Kohler Act (at issue in Ma-
<br />hon) and the Subsidence Act (at issue in
<br />
<br />7. This principle of generality is well rooted in
<br />our broader understandings of the: Consti~tion
<br />as designed in part to control the "mischiefs of
<br />faction." See The Federalist No. 10, p. 43 (G.
<br />Wins ed. 1982) (J. Madison).
<br />
<br />An analogous concern arises in First Amend-
<br />ment law. There we have recognized that an
<br />individual's rights are not violated when ,his reli-
<br />gious, p~tices are prohibited under a neutral
<br />'law'of general applicability. For example. in
<br />Employmem Div.. Dept. of Human Resources of
<br />Oregon ,v. Smith. 494 U.S. 872.879-880. 110
<br />S.Ct. 1595. 1600. 108 L.Ed.2d 876 (1990). we
<br />observed:
<br />"[Our] decisions have consistently held that the
<br />right of free exercise does not relieve an individ-
<br />ual of the obligation to comply with a 'valid and
<br />neutral law of general applicability on the
<br />ground that the law proscribes (or prescribes)
<br />conduct that his religion prescribes (or pro-
<br />scribes): United States v. Lee. 455 U.S. 252.263.
<br />n. 3. 102 S.Ct. 1051, 1054. n. 3. 71 L.Ed.2d 127
<br />(1982) (STEVENS. J.. concurring in judg-
<br />ment).... In Prince v. Massachusetts. 321 U.S.
<br />158.64 S.Ct. 438. 88 L.Ed. 645 (1944). w~ held
<br />
<br />Keystone ), we found significant that the reg-
<br />ulatory function of the latter was substantial-
<br />ly broader. Unlike the Kohl~ which
<br />simply transferred back to the surface own-
<br />ers certain rights that they had earlier sold
<br />to the coal companies, the Subsidence Act
<br />affected all surface owners-including the
<br />coal companies-equally. See Keystone, 480
<br />U.S.. at 486,107 S.Ct, at 1242. Perhaps the
<br />most familiar application of this principle of
<br />generality arises in zoning cases. A diminu-
<br />tion in value caused by a zoning regulation is
<br />far less likely to constitute a taking if it is
<br />part of a general and comprehensive land-use
<br />plan, see Euclid v. Ambler Realty Co.. 272
<br />U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct. 114, 71 L.Ed. 30& (1926);
<br />conversely, "spot zoning" is far more likely to
<br />constitute a taking, see Penn Central, 438
<br />U.S., at 132, and n. 28, 98 S.Ct., at 2663, and
<br />n.28.
<br />
<br />The presumption that a permanent physi":
<br />ca1 occupation, no matter how slight, effects a
<br />taking is wholly consistent with this princi-
<br />ple. A physical taking, entails a certain
<br />amount of "singling out" 8 Consjstent with
<br />this principle, physical occupations by third
<br />parties are more likely to effect takings than
<br />other physical occupations. Thus, a regula-
<br />
<br />that a mother could be prosecuted under the
<br />child labor laws for using her children to dis-
<br />pense literature in the streets, her religious moti-
<br />vation notwithstimding. We found no constitu.
<br />tional infirmity in 'excluding [these, children]
<br />from doing there what no other children may
<br />do: Id.. at 171. 64 S.Ct.. at 444. In Braunfeld v.
<br />Brown. 366 U.S. 599. 81 S.Ct. 1144. 6 L.Ed.2d
<br />563 (1961) (plurality opinion), we upheld Sun-
<br />day-closing laws against the claim that they bur-
<br />dened the religious practices of persons whose
<br />religions compelled them to refrain from work
<br />on other days. In Gillette v. United States, 401
<br />U.S. 437. 461. 91 S.Ct. 828, 842. 28 L.Ed.2d 168
<br />(1971). we sustained the milibiry Selective Ser-
<br />vice System against the claim that it violated free
<br />exercise by conscripting persons who opposed a
<br />particular war on religious grounds." '
<br />If such a neutral law of general applicability
<br />may severely burden constitutionally protected
<br />interests in liberty, a comparable burden on
<br />propcrty owners should not be considcred unrea-
<br />sonably onerous.
<br />
<br />8. See Levmore. Takings. Torts. and Special In- '
<br />terests, 77 Va.L.Rev. 1333. 1352-1354 (1991).
<br />
|