Item A: Police Oversight System - Roles and Expectations

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Police Complaint System and Civilian Oversight Recommendations In spite of these challenges, committee membersagreed that community expectations for an independent, credible complaint process that is accountable to the public would not be met with just an auditor in place. Similarly, the committee did not believe that a review board alone would help identify the procedural and training changes that would improve not only the complaint system, but enhance police services to the public. With a focus on hybrid oversight models, the committee developed four distinct civilian review board models and requested City Attorney advice on the legal and employee contract challenges associated with implementing each variation. Several common characteristics were shared between all the civilian review board models under consideration: The review board would be comprised of community volunteers appointed/selected o by the Mayor and City Council. Staff support to the board would be provided through a police auditor’s office, which o at a minimum, reports to the board on complaint trends/statistics and other work relevant to the auditor’s office. The review board and the auditor would provide trends and policy information to the Police Commission. Investigations would normally be conducted by the internal affairs unit and monitored o by the auditor, although the auditor would have the authority to request additional or outside investigations. Final decisions for employee discipline would remain with the Chief of Police. o A charter amendment would be required to enable the City Council to appoint a o civilian review board that reviews complaints surrounding employee conduct and to allow the hiring of an auditor that is answerable to the City Council. Review board meetings would be open to the public; confidentiality issues should be o addressed through procedural or contract negotiation avenues. Of the four models discussed, the committee was least interested in a system that allowed complainants to appeal the outcome of their investigation to the civilian review board. These systems posed the most potential for legal and employee contract problems, could become a costly, adversarial and duplicative quasi-judicial proceeding, and were unlikely to create improved satisfaction from those involved in the process (appellants, review board members, and employees alike). The committee agreed that its preferred options were a: Bifurcated Investigation Model, where the board would oversee specific cases as they o were being investigated and with the auditor, would develop findings on those cases prior to the Chief developing an adjudication; and Closed Complaint Review, where a complainant can present concerns about the o outcome of the case to the review board, which will review the file and develop findings on the case for delivery to the auditor and Chief of Police, but would not impact the outcome of the investigation. 7