Item B: Ordinance Concerning Goal 5 Natural Resources Study

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2890 112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER 505 U.s. 1009 20 feet landward of, and parallel to, the baseline. ~ ~9-290(A). The Act provid- ed no exceptions. B Lucas promptly filed suit in the South Carolina Court of Common Pleas, contending that the Beachfront Management Act's con- struction bar effected a taking of his proper- ty without just compensation. Lucas did not take issue with the validity of the Act as a lawful exercise of South Carolina's police power, but contended that the Act's complete extinguishment of his property's value enti- tled him to compensation regardless of whether the legislature had acted in further- ance of legitimate police power objectives. Following a bench trial, the court agreed. Among its factual determinations was the finding that "at the time Lucas purchased the two lots, both were zoned for single- family residential construction and ... there were no restrictions imp()sed upon such use of the property by either the State of South Carolina, the County of Charleston, or the Town of the Isle of Palms." App. to Pet. for Cart. 36. The trial court further found that the Beachfront Management Act decreed a permanent ban on construction insofar as Lucas's lots were concerned, and that this prohibition "deprive[d] Lucas of any reason- able economic use of the lots, ... eliminated the unrestricted right of use, and render[ed] them valueless." ld., at 37. The court thus concluded that Lucas's properties had been "taken" by operation of the Act, and it or- dered respondent to pay "just compensation" in the amount of $1,232,387.50. ld., at 40. the court believed itself bound to accept the "uncontested ... findings" of the South Car- olina Legislature that new construction in the coastal zone-such as petitioner intended- threatened this public resource. ld., at 383, 404 S.E.2d, at 898. The court roled that when a regulation respecting the use of prop- erty is designed ''to prevent serious public harm," id., at 383, 404 S.E.2d, at 899 (citing, inter alia, Mugkr v. KanSas, 123 U.S. 623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 81 L.Ed. 205 (1887)), no compensa- tion is owing under the Takings Clause re- gardless of the regulation's effect on the property's value. Two justices dissented. They acknowl- edged that our MuglR:r line of cases recog- nizes governmental power to prohibit "nox- ious" uses of property-i.e.; uSes of property akin to "public nuisances"-without having to pay compensation. But they would not have characterized the Beachfront. Management Act's "primary purpose [as] the prevention of a nuisance." 804 S.C., at 395, 404 S.E.2d, at 906 (Harwell, J., dissenting). To the <lis-- senters, the chief purposes of the legislation, among them the promotion of tourism and the creation of a "habitat for indigenous flora and fauna," could not fairly be compared to nuisance abatement. ld., at 396, 404 S.E.2d, at 906. As a consequence, they would have affirmed the trial court's conclusion that the Act's obliteration of the value of petitioner's lots accomplished a taking: We granted certiorari. 502 U.S. 966, 112 S.Ct. 436, 116 L.Ed.2d 455 (1991). II The Supreme Court of South Carolina re- [1] As a threshold matter, we must brief~ versed. It found dispositive what it de- ly address the Council's suggestion that this scribed as. Lucas's concession "that the case is inappropriate for plenary review. M- -WloBeachfront Management Act [was] prop- ter briefing and argument before the South erly and validly designed to preserve ... Carolina Supreme Court, but prior to issu- South Carolina's beaches." 804 S.C. 376, ance of that court's opinion, the Beachfront 379, 404 S.E.2d 895, 896 (1991). Failing an Management Act was amended' to attack on the validity of the statute as such, ...wllauthorize the Council, in certain circum- dred forty-four square feet." ~ 48-39-290(A){1) and (2).