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<br />505 U.S. 1013
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as IIZ S.Ct. Z886 (199Z)
<br />
<br />2891
<br />
<br />stances, to issue "special permits", for the
<br />constructi9n or reconstruction. of habitable
<br />structures . seaward of the baseline. See
<br />S.C. Code Ann. ~ 48-39-290(D)(1) (Supp.
<br />1991). According to the Council, this amend-
<br />ment renders Lucas's claim of a permanent
<br />deprivation unripe, as Lucas may yet be able
<br />to secure permission to build on his property.
<br />"[The Court's] cases," we are reminded, "uni-
<br />formly reflect an insistence on. knowing the
<br />nature and extent of permitted development
<br />before adjudicating the constitUtionality of
<br />the regulations that purport to limit it."
<br />MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo Coun-
<br />ty, 477 U.S. 340,351;'106 S.Ct. 2561, 2567,91
<br />L.Ed.2d 285 (1986). " 'See ' also Agins v. City
<br />ofTiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260,100 S.Ct. 2138,
<br />2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (1980). Because peti-
<br />tioner "has not yet obtained a final decision
<br />regarding how [he] will be allowed to develop
<br />[his] property," Williamson County Regional
<br />Planning Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank, of
<br />Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 190, 105 S.Ct.
<br />3108, 3118,87 L.Ed.2d 126 (1985), the Coun-
<br />cil argues that he is not yet entitled to defini-
<br />tive adjudication of his takings claim in this
<br />Court.
<br />
<br />We think these considerations would pre-
<br />clude review had the South Carolina Su-
<br />preme Court rested its judgment on ripeness
<br />grounds, as it was (essentially) invited to do
<br />by the Council. See Brief for Respondent 9,
<br />n. 3. The South Carolina Supreme Court
<br />shrugged. off th~. possil?~FY of futth~ a<:b.nin-.
<br />istrative and trial proceoomgll; however. pre-
<br />ferring to dispose of Lucas'sta1dngs .cla;iin on'
<br />the merits. Cf., e.g., San: Die!J?' Gels '&:Elec-
<br />tric Co. v. San Di8g0; 15Q ~'~;,62~~ Q31.~2,
<br />101 S.Ct. l2S7, ~293-i294, 67 L.Ed.2? ,651
<br />(1981). This unusual" disposition', doe~: not
<br />preclude Lucas' froni applying for a permit
<br />under the 1990 amendment for future con-
<br />struction, and challenging, on takings
<br />
<br />3. Justice BLACKMUN insists that this aspect of
<br />Lucas's claim is "not justiciable," post, at 2907,
<br />because Lucas never fulfi!\ed his obligation un-
<br />der Williamson County Regional Planning
<br />Comm'n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473
<br />U.S. 172, 105 S.Ct. 3108, 87 L.Ed.2d.126 (1985),
<br />to "submi[t] a plan for development of [his] prop-
<br />
<br />grounds, any denial. But it does preclude,
<br />both practically and. legally, any takings
<br />claim with respect to Lucas's past depriva-
<br />tion, i.e., for his having been denied construc-
<br />tion rights during the period before the 1990
<br />amendment. See generally First English
<br />Evangelical Lutheran Church of Glendale v.
<br />County of Los Angeles, 482 U.S. 304, 107
<br />S.Ct. 2378, 96 L.Ed.2d 250 (1987) (holding
<br />thatl1g12temporary deprivations of use are
<br />compensable under the Takings Clause).
<br />Without even so much as commenting upon
<br />the consequences of the South Carolina Su-
<br />preme Court's judgment in this respect, the
<br />Council insists that permitting Lucas to
<br />press his claim of a past, deprivation on this
<br />appeal would be improper, since "the issues
<br />of whether and to what extent [Lucas] has
<br />incurred a temporary taking . .. have simply
<br />never been addressed." Brief for Respon-
<br />dent '11. Yet LucaS had no reason to pro-
<br />ceed on a "temporary taking" theory at trial,
<br />or even to seek remand for that purpose
<br />prior to submission of the case to the South
<br />Carolina Supreme Court, since as the Act
<br />then read, the taking was unconditional and
<br />permanent. Moreover, given the breadth of
<br />the South Carolina Supreme Court's holding
<br />and judgment, Lucas would plainly be unable
<br />(absent our intervention now) to obtain fur-
<br />ther state-court adjudication with respect to
<br />the 1988-1990 period.
<br />
<br />. ~n these cirCumstances, we think it would
<br />not~or,4.with sound P~sSto insist that
<br />Lucas pursue . th~'Jate-created'''~ per-
<br />mit"p~edur~' }j~~~. .JUs' takln~.climn ~ '
<br />be cOpSidered ripe., lJUcas ~ p:roperly al-
<br />leged Article, III injury in'fact' mthis case; .
<br />~th respect to both thepre--l990' and post~
<br />1990 constraints placed on the use of his
<br />parcels by the. Beaehfront Management Act.s
<br />That there is a discr.l!:!.onarylols "special per-
<br />
<br />erty" to the proper state authorities, iii, at 187.
<br />105 S.Ct., at 3117. See post, at 2907. But such
<br />a submission would have been pointless, as the
<br />Council stipulated below that no building permit
<br />would have been issued under the. .1988 Act,
<br />application or no application. Record 14 (stipu-
<br />lations). Nor does the peculiar posture of this
<br />
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