|
<br />2906
<br />
<br />112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
<br />
<br />505 U.S. 1039
<br />
<br />If the state legislature is cOITect that the
<br />prohibition on building in front of the setback
<br />line prevents serious hann, then, under this
<br />Court's prior cases, the Act is constitutional.
<br />"Long ago it was recognized that all property Nothing in the record undermines the
<br />in tlris country is held under the implied General Assembly's assessment that prohibi-
<br />obligation that the owner's use of it shall not tions on building in front of the setback line
<br />be injurious to the community,. and the Tak- are necessary to protect people and property
<br />ings Clause did not transform that principle from storms, high tides, and beach erosion.
<br />to one that requires compensation whenever Because that legislative determination cannot
<br />the State asserts its power to ~rcel()40 it." be disregarded in the absence of such evi-
<br />Keystone Bituminous Coal Assn. 'IJ. DeBen- dence, see, e.g., Euclid, 272 U.S., at 388, 47
<br />edictis, 480 U.s. 470, 491-492,107 S.Ot. 1232, S.Ct., at 118; O'Gorman & Young, lnc. 'IJ.
<br />1245, 94 L.Ed2d 472 (1987) (internal quota- Hartford Fire Ins. Co., 282 U.S. 251, 257-
<br />tion marks omitted); see also id., at 488-489, 258, 51 S.Ct. 130, 132, 75 L.Ed. 324 (1931)
<br />and n. 18, 107 S.Ct., at 1244, n. 18. The (Brandeis, J.), and because its determination
<br />Court consistently has upheld regulations im- _l1941of hann to life and property from build-
<br />posed to arrest a significant threat to the ing is sufficient to prohibit that. use under
<br />common welfare, whatever their economic et- this Court's cases, the South Carolina Su-
<br />feet on the owner. See, e.g., Goldblatt v. preme Court correctly found no taking.
<br />Hempstead, 369 U.S. 590, 592-593, 82 S.Ot.
<br />987, 989, 8 L.Ed.2d 130 (1962); Euclid v.
<br />Ambler ReaUy Co., 272 U.S. 365, 47 S.Ct.
<br />114, 71 L.Ed. 303 (1926); Gorieb v. Fox, 274
<br />U.S. 603, 608,.47 S.Ot. 675, 677, 71 t..Ed.
<br />1228 (1927); M'U(Jler v. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623,
<br />8 S.Ot. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887).
<br />
<br />line stability in an economical and effective
<br />manner." S.C.Code Ann. ~ 48-39-250(1)(a)
<br />(Supp.l990). . The General Assembly also
<br />found that "development unwisely has been
<br />sited too close to the [beach/dune] system.
<br />This type of development has jeopardized the
<br />stability of the beach/dune system, accelerat-
<br />ed erosion, and endangered adjacent proper-
<br />ty." ~ 48-39-250(4); see also ~ 48-39-
<br />250(6) (discussing the need to "afford the
<br />beach/dune system space to accrete and
<br />erode'').
<br />
<br />Petitioner never challenged the legisla-
<br />ture's findings that a building ban was neces-
<br />sary to protect property and life. Nor did he
<br />contend that the threatened harm was not
<br />sufficiently serious to make. building a house
<br />in a particular location a "harmful" use, that
<br />the legislature had not made sufficient find-
<br />ings, or that the legislature was motivated by
<br />anything other than a desire to minimize
<br />damage to coastal areas. Indeed, petitioner
<br />
<br />objected at trial that evidence as to the pur-
<br />poses of the setback requirement was irrele-
<br />vant. Tr. 68. Tbe South Carolina Supreme
<br />Court accordingly understood petitioner not
<br />to contest the State's position that "discour-
<br />aging new construction in close proximity to
<br />the beach/dune area is necessary to prevent
<br />a great public harm," 304 S.C. 376, 383, 404
<br />S.E.2d 895, 898 (1991), and "to prevent seri-
<br />ous injury to the community." ld., at 387,
<br />404 S.E2d, at 901. The court considered
<br />itself ''bound by these uncontested legislative
<br />findings ... [in the absence of] any attack
<br />whatsoever on the statutory scheme." ld., at
<br />383, 404 S.E.2d, at 898.
<br />
<br />II
<br />
<br />My disagreement with the Court begins
<br />with its decision to review this case. This
<br />Court has held consistently that a land-use
<br />challenge is not ripe tor review until there is
<br />a final decision about what uses of the prop-
<br />erty will be permitted. The ripeness re-
<br />quirement is not simply a gesture of good
<br />will to land-use planners. In the absence of
<br />"a final and authoritative determination of
<br />the type and intensity of development legally
<br />permitted on the subject property," Mac-
<br />Donald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County,
<br />477 U.S. 340, 348, 106 S.Ct. 2561, 2566, 91
<br />L.Ed.2d 285 (1986), and the utilization of
<br />
|