Item B: Ordinance Concerning Goal 5 Natural Resources Study

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505 U.s. 1047 LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992) 2909 Clearly, the Court was eager to decide this case.' But eagerness, in the absence of proper jurisdiction, must-and in this case should have been-met with restraint. III The Court's willingness to dispense with precedent in its haste to reach a result is not limited to its initial jurisdictional decision. The Court also alters the long-settled rules of review. showing a state law constitutes a taking. See Keystone Bituminous Coal, ,480 U.S., at 485, 107 S.Ct., at 1242. See also Goldblat4 369 U.S., at 594, 82 S.Ct., at 990 (citing "the usual presumption of constitutionality" that applies to statutes attacked as takings). Rather than invoking these traditional rules, the Court decides the State has the burden to convince the courts that its legisla- tive judgments are correct.. Despite Lucas' complete failure to contest the' legislature's findingS of serious harm to life and property if a Permanent structure is built, the Court decides that the legislative findings ate not sufficient to justify the use prohibition. In- stead, the Court "emphasize[s]" the State ~~oom~thanm~~~~r~regis~ tive judgments to avoid invalidating its law. Ante, at 2901. In this case, apparently, the State now has the burden of showing the regulation is not a taking. The Court offers no justification for its sudden hostility toward state legislators, and I doubt that it could. The South Carolina Supreme Court's deci- sion to defer to legislative judgments in the absence of a challenge from petitioner com- ports with one of this Court's oldest maxims: "[T]he existence of facts supporting the legis- lative judgment is to be presumed." United States 'V. Carolene Products Co., 304 U.S. . 144, 152, 58 S.Ct. 778,783, 82 L.Ed. 1234 (1938). Indeed, we have said the legisla~ ture's judgment is "well-nigh' conclusive." Berman 'V. P~1046 348 U.S. 26, 32, 75 S.Ct. 98, 102, 99 L.Ed. 27 (1954). See also Sweet 'V. Reche4 159 U.S. 380, 392, 16 S.Ct. 43, 45-46, 40 L.Ed. 188 (1895); Euclid, 272 U.S., at 388, 47 S.Ct., at 118 ("If the validity of the legislative classification for zoning pur- poses be fairly debatable, the legislative judgment must be allowed to control"), The Court does not reject the South Car- olina Supreme Court's decision simp~ on the Accordingly, this Court always has re- basis of its disbelief and distrust of the legis- quired plaintiffs challenging the co~tution- lature's findings. It also 'takes the opportu- ality of an ordinance to provide "some factual foundation of record" that contravenes' the nity to CJ'e11te a new scheme for regulations legislative findings. O'Gorman & Young, that eliminate all economic value. From now 282 U.8;, at 258, 51 S.Ct., at 132. In.the on, there is a categorical rule finding these absence of such proof, "the presumption of regulations to be a taking unless the use they constitutionality mu~ prevail." ld., at 257, .j,w4,prohibit is a background common-law nui- 51 S.Ct., .at 132. We only recently have sance or property principle. See ante, at reaffirmed that claimants have the burden of 2899-2901. 7. The Court overlooks the lack of a ripe and justiciable claim apparently out of concern that in the absence of its intervention Lucas will be unable to obtain further adjudication of his tem- porary takings claim. The Court chastises re- spondent for arguing that Lucas' temporary tak- ings claim is premature because it failed "so much as [to] commen[t]" upon the effect of the South Carolina Supreme Court's decision on pe- titioner's ability to obtain relief for the 2-year period, and it frets that Lucas would "be unable IV (absent our intervention now) to obtain further state-court adjudication with respect to the 1988-1990 period." Ante, at 289,1. Whatever the explanation for the Court's intense interest in Lucas' plight when ordinarily we are more cau- tious in granting discretionary review, the con- cern would have been more prudendy expressed by vacating the judgment below and remanding for further consideration in light of the 1990 amendments. At that point, petitioner could have brought a temporary takings claim in the state courts.