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<br />2910 <br /> <br />112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER <br /> <br />505 U.S. 1047 <br /> <br />A <br /> <br />I first question the Court's rationale fu <br />creating a category that obviates a "case- <br />specific inquiry into the public interest ad- <br />vanced," ante, at 2893, if all economic value <br />has been lost. If one fact about the Court's <br />takings jurisprudence can be stated without <br />contradiction, it is that "the particular cir- <br />cumstances of each case" determine whether <br />a specific restriction will be rendered invalid <br />by the government's failure to pay compensa- <br />tion. United States v. Central Eureka Min- <br />ing Co., 357. U.S. 155, 168, 78 s.Ct. 1097, <br />1104, 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (1958). This is so <br />because although we have articulated ~ertain <br />factors to be considered, including the eco- <br />nomic impact on the property Owner, the <br />ultimate conclusion "necessarily requires a <br />weighing of private and public interests." <br />Agins, 447 U.S., at 261, 100 S.Ct., at 2141. <br />When the government regulation prevents <br />the owner from any economically. valuable <br />use of his property, the private intereSt is <br />unquestionably substantial, but we have nev- <br />er before held that no public interest can <br />outweigh it. Instead the Court's prior deci- <br />sions ''uniformly reject the proposition that <br />diminution in property value, standing alone, <br />can establish a 'taking.''' Penn Central <br />Transp. Co. v. Ne:w York City, 438 U.S. 104, <br />131, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2663, 57 L.Ed.2d 631 <br />(1978). <br /> <br />This Court repeatedly has recognized the <br />ability of government, in certain circum- <br />stances, to. regulate property without com- <br />pensation no matter how adverse the finan- <br />cial effect on the owner. may be. More than <br />a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the <br />right of States to prohibit uses of property <br />injurious to public health, safety, or welfare <br />without paying compensation: "A prolubition <br />simply upon the use of property for purposes <br />that are declared, by valid legislation, to be <br />injurious to the health, morals, or safety of <br />the community, cannot, in any just sense, be <br /> <br />8. Prior to Mugler. the Court had held that owners <br />whose. real property is wholly destroyed to pre- <br />vent the spread of a fire are not entitled t') <br />compensation. Bowditch v. Boston. 101 U.S. 16. <br />18-19. 25 L.Ed. 980 (1880). And the Court <br /> <br />deemed a taking or an appropriation of prop- <br />erty." Mugler v. Kansas, 123.ll.048U.S., at <br />668-669, 8 S.Ct., at 301. On this basis, the <br />Court upheld an ordinance effectively prohib- <br />iting operation of a previously lawful brew- <br />ery, although the "establishments will be- <br />come of no value as property." Id., at 664, 8 <br />S.Ct., at 298; see also id., at 668, 8 S.Ct., at <br />300. <br /> <br />Mugler was only the beginning in a long <br />line of cases.8 In PoweU v. Pennsylvania, <br />127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253 <br />(1888), the Court upheld legislation prohib- <br />iting the manufacture of oleomargarine, de- <br />spite the owner's allegation that "if pre- <br />vented from continuing it, the value of his <br />property employed therein would be entire- <br />ly lost and he be deprived of the means of <br />livelihood." ld., at 682, 8 S.Ct., at 994. In <br />Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 <br />S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915), the Court <br />upheld an ordinance prolubiting a brick- <br />yard, although the owner had m~de excava- <br />tions on the land that prevented it from <br />being utilized for any purpose but a brick- <br />yard. Id., at 405, 36 S.Ct., at 143. In <br />Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct. <br />246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928), the Court held <br />that the Fifth Amendment did not require <br />Vll'ginia to pay compensation to the owner <br />of cedar trees ordered destroyed to prevent <br />a disease from spreading to nearby apple <br />orchards. The "preferment of [the public <br />interest] over the property interest of the <br />individual, to the extent even of its destruc- <br />tion, is one of the distinguishing character- <br />istics of every exercise of the police power <br />which affects property." ld., at 280, 48 <br />S.Ct., at 247. Again, in Omnia Commer- <br />cial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 43 <br />S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773 (1923), the Court <br />stated that "destruction of, or injury to, <br />property. is frequently accomplished without <br /> <br />recognized in the License Cases. 5 How. 504. <br />589. 12 t.Ed. 256 (1847) (opinion of McLean, J.). <br />that "[tlhe acknowledged police power of a State <br />extends .often to the destruction of property." <br />