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<br />2910
<br />
<br />112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
<br />
<br />505 U.S. 1047
<br />
<br />A
<br />
<br />I first question the Court's rationale fu
<br />creating a category that obviates a "case-
<br />specific inquiry into the public interest ad-
<br />vanced," ante, at 2893, if all economic value
<br />has been lost. If one fact about the Court's
<br />takings jurisprudence can be stated without
<br />contradiction, it is that "the particular cir-
<br />cumstances of each case" determine whether
<br />a specific restriction will be rendered invalid
<br />by the government's failure to pay compensa-
<br />tion. United States v. Central Eureka Min-
<br />ing Co., 357. U.S. 155, 168, 78 s.Ct. 1097,
<br />1104, 2 L.Ed.2d 1228 (1958). This is so
<br />because although we have articulated ~ertain
<br />factors to be considered, including the eco-
<br />nomic impact on the property Owner, the
<br />ultimate conclusion "necessarily requires a
<br />weighing of private and public interests."
<br />Agins, 447 U.S., at 261, 100 S.Ct., at 2141.
<br />When the government regulation prevents
<br />the owner from any economically. valuable
<br />use of his property, the private intereSt is
<br />unquestionably substantial, but we have nev-
<br />er before held that no public interest can
<br />outweigh it. Instead the Court's prior deci-
<br />sions ''uniformly reject the proposition that
<br />diminution in property value, standing alone,
<br />can establish a 'taking.''' Penn Central
<br />Transp. Co. v. Ne:w York City, 438 U.S. 104,
<br />131, 98 S.Ct. 2646, 2663, 57 L.Ed.2d 631
<br />(1978).
<br />
<br />This Court repeatedly has recognized the
<br />ability of government, in certain circum-
<br />stances, to. regulate property without com-
<br />pensation no matter how adverse the finan-
<br />cial effect on the owner. may be. More than
<br />a century ago, the Court explicitly upheld the
<br />right of States to prohibit uses of property
<br />injurious to public health, safety, or welfare
<br />without paying compensation: "A prolubition
<br />simply upon the use of property for purposes
<br />that are declared, by valid legislation, to be
<br />injurious to the health, morals, or safety of
<br />the community, cannot, in any just sense, be
<br />
<br />8. Prior to Mugler. the Court had held that owners
<br />whose. real property is wholly destroyed to pre-
<br />vent the spread of a fire are not entitled t')
<br />compensation. Bowditch v. Boston. 101 U.S. 16.
<br />18-19. 25 L.Ed. 980 (1880). And the Court
<br />
<br />deemed a taking or an appropriation of prop-
<br />erty." Mugler v. Kansas, 123.ll.048U.S., at
<br />668-669, 8 S.Ct., at 301. On this basis, the
<br />Court upheld an ordinance effectively prohib-
<br />iting operation of a previously lawful brew-
<br />ery, although the "establishments will be-
<br />come of no value as property." Id., at 664, 8
<br />S.Ct., at 298; see also id., at 668, 8 S.Ct., at
<br />300.
<br />
<br />Mugler was only the beginning in a long
<br />line of cases.8 In PoweU v. Pennsylvania,
<br />127 U.S. 678, 8 S.Ct. 992, 32 L.Ed. 253
<br />(1888), the Court upheld legislation prohib-
<br />iting the manufacture of oleomargarine, de-
<br />spite the owner's allegation that "if pre-
<br />vented from continuing it, the value of his
<br />property employed therein would be entire-
<br />ly lost and he be deprived of the means of
<br />livelihood." ld., at 682, 8 S.Ct., at 994. In
<br />Hadacheck v. Sebastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36
<br />S.Ct. 143, 60 L.Ed. 348 (1915), the Court
<br />upheld an ordinance prolubiting a brick-
<br />yard, although the owner had m~de excava-
<br />tions on the land that prevented it from
<br />being utilized for any purpose but a brick-
<br />yard. Id., at 405, 36 S.Ct., at 143. In
<br />Miller v. Schoene, 276 U.S. 272, 48 S.Ct.
<br />246, 72 L.Ed. 568 (1928), the Court held
<br />that the Fifth Amendment did not require
<br />Vll'ginia to pay compensation to the owner
<br />of cedar trees ordered destroyed to prevent
<br />a disease from spreading to nearby apple
<br />orchards. The "preferment of [the public
<br />interest] over the property interest of the
<br />individual, to the extent even of its destruc-
<br />tion, is one of the distinguishing character-
<br />istics of every exercise of the police power
<br />which affects property." ld., at 280, 48
<br />S.Ct., at 247. Again, in Omnia Commer-
<br />cial Co. v. United States, 261 U.S. 502, 43
<br />S.Ct. 437, 67 L.Ed. 773 (1923), the Court
<br />stated that "destruction of, or injury to,
<br />property. is frequently accomplished without
<br />
<br />recognized in the License Cases. 5 How. 504.
<br />589. 12 t.Ed. 256 (1847) (opinion of McLean, J.).
<br />that "[tlhe acknowledged police power of a State
<br />extends .often to the destruction of property."
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