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<br />2920
<br />
<br />112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER
<br />
<br />505 U.S. 1066
<br />
<br />family homes would render. the investor's
<br />property interest "valueless." 4 In short, the
<br />categorical rule will likely have one of two
<br />effects: Either courts will alter the definition
<br />of the "denominator" in the takings "frac-
<br />tion," rendering the Court's categorical rule
<br />meaningless. or investors will manipulate the
<br />relevant property interests,' giving the
<br />Court's rule sweeping effect. To my mind,
<br />neither of these results is desirable or appro-
<br />priate, and both are distortions of our tak-
<br />ingS jurisprudence.
<br />
<br />Finally, the Court's justification for its new
<br />categorical rule is remarkably thin. The
<br />Court mentions in passing three arguments
<br />in support of its rule; none is convincing.
<br />First, the Court suggests that "total depriva-
<br />tion of feasible use is, from the landowner's
<br />point of view, the equivalent of a physical
<br />appropriation:' Ante, at. 2894. This argu-
<br />ment proves too much. From the "landown-
<br />er's point of view," a regulation that dimin-
<br />ishes . a lot's value by 50% is as well "the
<br />equivalent" of the condemnation of half of the
<br />lot. Yet, it is well established. that a 50%
<br />diminution in value does not by. itself consti-
<br />tute a taking~ See Euclid 'lJ. Amblerkealty
<br />Co., 272 U.S. 365. 384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117, 71
<br />L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75% diminution in value).
<br />Thus, the landowner's perception of the regu-
<br />lation cannot justify the Court's new rule.
<br />
<br />Second, the Court emphasizes that because
<br />total takings are ''relatively rare" its new
<br />rule will not adversely affect the govern-
<br />ment's ability to "go on." Ante, at 2894.
<br />This argument proves too little. Certainly it
<br />is true that defining a small class of regula-
<br />tions that are per 8e takings. will not
<br />...1!.067greatly hinder important governmental
<br />functions-but this is true of any small class
<br />of regulations. The Court's suggestion only
<br />begs the question of why regulations of this
<br />particular class should always be found to
<br />effect takings.
<br />
<br />4. This unfortunate possibility is created by the
<br />Court's subtle revision of the "total regulatory
<br />takings" dicta. In past decisions, we have stated
<br />that a regulation effects a taking if it "denies an
<br />owner economically viable use of his land,"
<br />Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100
<br />
<br />Finally, the Court suggests that "regula-
<br />tions that leave the owner ... without eco-
<br />nomically beneficial ... use ... carry with
<br />them a heightened risk that private property
<br />is being pressed into some form of public
<br />service." Ibid. As discussed more fully be-
<br />low, see Part III, infra, I agree that the risks
<br />of such singling out are of central concern in
<br />takings law. However, such risks do not
<br />justify a per se rule for total regulatory
<br />takings. There is no necessary correlation
<br />between "singling out" and total takings: . A
<br />regulation may single out a property owner
<br />without depriving him of all of his property,
<br />see, e.g., NoUan 'lJ.. California Coastal
<br />Comm 1? 483 U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141.
<br />3149,97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); J.E.D. ~s8oci-
<br />ates, Inc. 'lJ. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A2d
<br />12 (1981); and it may deprive him of all of
<br />his property without singling him out, see,
<br />e.g., Mugler 'lJ. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. 8 S.Ct.
<br />273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); Hadacheck v. Se-
<br />bastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143. 60 L.Ed.
<br />348 (1915). . What matters in such cases is
<br />not the degree. of diminution of value, but
<br />rather the specificity of the expropriating
<br />act. For this reason, the Court's third justi-
<br />fication for its new rule also fails.
<br />
<br />In short, the Court's new rule is unsup-
<br />ported by prior decisions, arbitrary and un-
<br />sound in practice, and theoretically unjusti-
<br />fied. In my opinion, a categorical rule as
<br />important as the one established by the
<br />Court today should be supported by more
<br />history or more reason than has yet been
<br />provided.
<br />
<br />The Nuisance Exception
<br />
<br />Like many bright-line rules, the categori-
<br />cal rule established in this case is only "cate-
<br />gorical" for a page or two in the U.S. Re-
<br />ports. No sooner does the Court
<br />state that "total regulatory takings must be
<br />
<br />S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (I980)(empha-
<br />sis added), indicating that this "total takings"
<br />test did not apply to other estates. Today, how-
<br />ever, the Court suggests that a. regulation may
<br />effect a total taking of any real property interest.
<br />See ante, at 2894, n. 7.
<br />
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