Laserfiche WebLink
<br />2920 <br /> <br />112 SUPREME COURT REPORTER <br /> <br />505 U.S. 1066 <br /> <br />family homes would render. the investor's <br />property interest "valueless." 4 In short, the <br />categorical rule will likely have one of two <br />effects: Either courts will alter the definition <br />of the "denominator" in the takings "frac- <br />tion," rendering the Court's categorical rule <br />meaningless. or investors will manipulate the <br />relevant property interests,' giving the <br />Court's rule sweeping effect. To my mind, <br />neither of these results is desirable or appro- <br />priate, and both are distortions of our tak- <br />ingS jurisprudence. <br /> <br />Finally, the Court's justification for its new <br />categorical rule is remarkably thin. The <br />Court mentions in passing three arguments <br />in support of its rule; none is convincing. <br />First, the Court suggests that "total depriva- <br />tion of feasible use is, from the landowner's <br />point of view, the equivalent of a physical <br />appropriation:' Ante, at. 2894. This argu- <br />ment proves too much. From the "landown- <br />er's point of view," a regulation that dimin- <br />ishes . a lot's value by 50% is as well "the <br />equivalent" of the condemnation of half of the <br />lot. Yet, it is well established. that a 50% <br />diminution in value does not by. itself consti- <br />tute a taking~ See Euclid 'lJ. Amblerkealty <br />Co., 272 U.S. 365. 384, 47 S.Ct. 114, 117, 71 <br />L.Ed. 303 (1926) (75% diminution in value). <br />Thus, the landowner's perception of the regu- <br />lation cannot justify the Court's new rule. <br /> <br />Second, the Court emphasizes that because <br />total takings are ''relatively rare" its new <br />rule will not adversely affect the govern- <br />ment's ability to "go on." Ante, at 2894. <br />This argument proves too little. Certainly it <br />is true that defining a small class of regula- <br />tions that are per 8e takings. will not <br />...1!.067greatly hinder important governmental <br />functions-but this is true of any small class <br />of regulations. The Court's suggestion only <br />begs the question of why regulations of this <br />particular class should always be found to <br />effect takings. <br /> <br />4. This unfortunate possibility is created by the <br />Court's subtle revision of the "total regulatory <br />takings" dicta. In past decisions, we have stated <br />that a regulation effects a taking if it "denies an <br />owner economically viable use of his land," <br />Agins v. City of Tiburon, 447 U.S. 255, 260, 100 <br /> <br />Finally, the Court suggests that "regula- <br />tions that leave the owner ... without eco- <br />nomically beneficial ... use ... carry with <br />them a heightened risk that private property <br />is being pressed into some form of public <br />service." Ibid. As discussed more fully be- <br />low, see Part III, infra, I agree that the risks <br />of such singling out are of central concern in <br />takings law. However, such risks do not <br />justify a per se rule for total regulatory <br />takings. There is no necessary correlation <br />between "singling out" and total takings: . A <br />regulation may single out a property owner <br />without depriving him of all of his property, <br />see, e.g., NoUan 'lJ.. California Coastal <br />Comm 1? 483 U.S. 825, 837, 107 S.Ct. 3141. <br />3149,97 L.Ed.2d 677 (1987); J.E.D. ~s8oci- <br />ates, Inc. 'lJ. Atkinson, 121 N.H. 581, 432 A2d <br />12 (1981); and it may deprive him of all of <br />his property without singling him out, see, <br />e.g., Mugler 'lJ. Kansas, 123 U.S. 623. 8 S.Ct. <br />273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887); Hadacheck v. Se- <br />bastian, 239 U.S. 394, 36 S.Ct. 143. 60 L.Ed. <br />348 (1915). . What matters in such cases is <br />not the degree. of diminution of value, but <br />rather the specificity of the expropriating <br />act. For this reason, the Court's third justi- <br />fication for its new rule also fails. <br /> <br />In short, the Court's new rule is unsup- <br />ported by prior decisions, arbitrary and un- <br />sound in practice, and theoretically unjusti- <br />fied. In my opinion, a categorical rule as <br />important as the one established by the <br />Court today should be supported by more <br />history or more reason than has yet been <br />provided. <br /> <br />The Nuisance Exception <br /> <br />Like many bright-line rules, the categori- <br />cal rule established in this case is only "cate- <br />gorical" for a page or two in the U.S. Re- <br />ports. No sooner does the Court <br />state that "total regulatory takings must be <br /> <br />S.Ct. 2138, 2141, 65 L.Ed.2d 106 (I980)(empha- <br />sis added), indicating that this "total takings" <br />test did not apply to other estates. Today, how- <br />ever, the Court suggests that a. regulation may <br />effect a total taking of any real property interest. <br />See ante, at 2894, n. 7. <br />