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<br />505 U.S. 1069
<br />
<br />LUCAS v. SOUTH CAROLINA COASTAL COUNCIL
<br />Cite as 112 S.Ct. 2886 (1992)
<br />
<br />2921
<br />
<br />compensated," ante, at 2899, than it quickly
<br />establishes an exception to that rule.
<br />
<br />,..W6sThe exception provides that a regUla-
<br />tion that renders property valueleSs is not a
<br />taking if it prohibits uses of property that
<br />Were not "previously permissible under rele-
<br />vant property and nuisance principles;"
<br />Ante, at 2901. The Court thus rejects the
<br />basic holding in Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U.S.
<br />623, 8 S.Ct. 273, 31 L.Ed. 205 (1887). There
<br />we held that a state-wide statute that prohfu.,
<br />ited the owner of a brewery from making
<br />alcoholic beverages did not effect a taking,
<br />even though the use pf the property had
<br />been perfectly lawful and caused no public
<br />harm before the statute was enacted. We
<br />squarely.rejected the rule the Court adopts
<br />today:
<br />"It is tnie, that, when the defendants .,.
<br />erected their breweries, the laws of the
<br />State did not forbid the manufacture of
<br />intoxicating liquors. But the State did not
<br />thereby give any 8S!lurance, or come under
<br />an obligation, that its legislation upon that
<br />subject would remain unchanged. ' [T]he
<br />supervision of the public health and the
<br />public morals is a governmental power,
<br />'continuing in its nature,' and 'to be dealt
<br />with as the special exigencies of the mo-:
<br />moot may require;' .,. 'for this purpose,
<br />the largest legislative discretion is allowed,
<br />and the discretion cannot be parted ~th
<br />any more than the power itself.'" Id.,at
<br />669, 8S.Ct., at 301.
<br />
<br />Under our reasoning in Mugler, a State's
<br />decision to .prohibit or to regulate certain
<br />uses of property is not a compensable taking
<br />just because the particular uses were previ-
<br />ously lawful 'Under the Court's opinion to-:
<br />day, however, if a State should decide to
<br />prohibit the' manufacture of asbestos. ciga-
<br />rettes, or concealable firearms, for example,
<br />it must be prepared to pay for the adverse
<br />economic consequences of its decision. One
<br />must wonder if government will be able to
<br />"go on" effectively if it must risk compensa-
<br />tion "for every such change in the general
<br />law." Mahon, 260 U.S., at 413, 43 S.Ct., at
<br />159.
<br />
<br />The Court's holding today effectively
<br />freezes the State's common law, denying the
<br />legislature much of its tradition~power
<br />to revise the law governing the rights and
<br />uses of property. Until today, I had. thought
<br />that we had long abandoned this approach to
<br />constitutional law. More than a century ago
<br />we recognized that "the great office of stat-
<br />utes is to remedy defects in the common law
<br />as they are developed, and to. adapt it to the
<br />changes of time and circumstances." Munn
<br />1/. ,lUinois, 94 U.s. 113,. 134, 24 L.Ed. 77
<br />(1877). As Justice Marshall observed about
<br />a poSition similar to that adopted by the
<br />Court today:
<br />"If accepted, that claim would represent a
<br />return to the era of Lochner 1/. New Y OTk,
<br />198 U.S. 45 [25 S.Ct. 539, 49L.Ed. 937]
<br />(1905), when common-law rights 'were also
<br />found immune from revision by State or
<br />Federal Government. Such an approach
<br />would freeze the common law as it has
<br />been constructed by the courts, perhaps at
<br />its 19th-century state of development. It
<br />would allow no' room for change in re-
<br />sponse to changes in circumstance. . The
<br />Due PrOcess Clause does not require such
<br />a result." PruneYard Shupping Center 1/.
<br />Robins,' 447 U.S. 74, 93, 100 S.Ct. 2035,
<br />2047, 64 L.Ed.2d 741 (1980) (concurring
<br />opinion).
<br />Arresting the development of the common
<br />law is not only a departure from our prior
<br />decisions; it is also profoundly unwise. The
<br />human condition is one of constant. learning
<br />and evolution-both moral and, practical.
<br />Legislatures implement that new learning;
<br />in doing so they must often revise the defini-
<br />tion of property and the rights of property
<br />owners. Thus, when 1J1e Nation came to
<br />understand that slavery was morally wrong
<br />and mandated the emancipation of all slaves,
<br />it, in effect, reaefined "property." On a less-
<br />er scale, our ongoing self-educatioD produces
<br />similar changes in the rights of property
<br />owners: New appreciation of the significance
<br />of endangered species, see, e.g.; Andrus 1/.
<br />AUard, 444 U.S. 51, 100 S.Ct. 318, 62
<br />L.Ed.2d 210 (1979); the importance of wet-
<br />lands, see, e.g., 16 U.S.C. ~ 3801 et seq.; and
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