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She noted that the drafted ordinance amendments would allow the police auditor to still monitor <br />the investigation performed by the city manager. <br />[NAME REDACTED] was glad that the PAORC had addressed the distinctions between the <br />police chief and regular sworn officers with respect to police oversight matters. They noted that <br />the pertinent question now concerned who would be in charge of contracting any external <br />oversight agencies. They expressed that the police auditor must be an autonomous entity with the <br />ability to contract for an external investigation in whatever manner they saw fit. <br />[NAME REDACTED] believed it was highly important to restore the morality of the community <br />through an improved police oversight process, and that the police auditor should also have the power <br />to make retroactive investigations in order to address any complaints that might still be unresolved. <br />[NAME REDACTED] asked Mr. Lidz specifically how the PAORC had conducted discussions <br />regarding the different legal interpretations of the City Charter that had arisen out of the police <br />auditor ordinance amendment discussions. They noted that there seemed to be significant <br />differences of opinion regarding the Charter and asked for clarification. <br />Ms. Syrett stated her recollections were that a discussion of varying legal interpretations of the <br />Charter had not been a part of the committee’s conversations. <br />Mr. Lidz agreed that there were differences of opinion regarding what actually changed in the <br />Charter last fall, but noted that those varying opinions had not impacted the PAORC discussions. <br />[NAME REDACTED] noted that regardless of the different interpretations of certain sections of <br />the Charter, it was explicit in that it granted the police auditor the power to contract out for <br />external investigations. They noted that the old Charter language had been drafted in such a <br />manner that the city manager’s authority would be unchallenged with respect to any police <br />oversight procedures involving the police chief which was one of the reasons problems with <br />police oversight matters had arisen in the first place. They further expressed concern that many <br />of the audits of complaints conducted by the city manager’s office regarding the Magana rampage <br />had been carefully constrained and kept confidential. <br />[NAME REDACTED] felt that the previous Charter amendments were an attempt by the citizens <br />of Eugene to tell the City that they wanted an independent police auditor, but that the City’s <br />execution of the directives of the Charter had in essence resulted in a substitution of the police <br />auditor with a city manager who operated without transparency or accountability. <br />Ms. Reynolds maintained that the previous Charter amendments contradicted Section D of the <br />ordinance which stated that “the auditor’s office conducts the preliminary investigation of all <br />complaints lodged with the auditor’s office or internal affairs to appropriately classify and route <br />the complaint.” <br />Mr. Ahlen reiterated that the intent of Item 10 was to treat complaints involving the chief of <br />police the same as regular police officers. He noted there were subtleties in the chain of <br />command that needed to be addressed and refined. <br />[NAME REDACTED] expressed that the citizens of Eugene wanted to see the police auditor’s <br />powers expanded as part of a city-wide effort to monitor and audit the efforts of all City <br />employees, including the city manager. Another community member responded that there were <br /> <br />