Item B: Police Auditor Ordinance Review Report

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subpoena power, Ms. Reynolds noted that the police auditor’s office wanted to have EPD internal affairs investigators granted subpoena power as well. Mr. Chase agreed with previous public comments regarding the discretionary authority of EPD officers, but worried that removing that authority altogether would make many members of the public less likely to file complaints. Mr. Lidz commented that it was very difficult to draft a comprehensive policy regarding subpoena power for the police auditor and/or internal affairs investigators due to the wide range of circumstances involved. [NAME REDACTED] did not feel it would be prudent to completely remove the discretionary authority of EPD officers to classify complaints and that asking members of the public to “take it to my boss” might be received poorly by the public. They noted that the police commission often received complaints that were dismissed for the lack of evidence that often occurred when a complainant would take their concerns to the auditor rather than addressing them through an EPD officer. [NAME REDACTED] felt that the ordinance motion item regarding the police auditor’s budget and the friendly amendment item regarding their subpoena power were inextricably linked and that granting discretionary authority to EPD officers increased their ability and desire to act in an over-reaching investigative capacity. [NAME REDACTED] felt that it was unsafe that the police auditor’s office was separate from the police offices at City Hall, and asked why it was taking the PAORC and City Council so long to determine and implement an effective police oversight process. Mr. Chase responded that the PAORC, the City Council, and the City staff were more concerned with getting the process done properly and effectively than getting it done quickly. Mr. Pryor felt that the public’s comments were very helpful and commented that the PAORC’s discussions regarding police oversight issues essentially broke down to questions regarding: What’s an effective and fair process for police complaints? Who should be doing what within that process and where does each person’s authority reside? And where is the transparency in the police oversight process? He noted that those questions were indicative of the shared interests of the public and the PAORC. [NAME REDACTED] noted that subpoena powers for the police auditor were essential to the police oversight process and that such powers could be used to bring police complaints to the public’s attention. They further believed that any funding decisions made regarding the police auditor’s budget would by their very nature be political decisions. [NAME REDACTED] asked for an explanation as to why the police unions had been so resistant to the public’s insistence on effective police oversight. Ms. Teninty indicated that they would attempt to answer that question during the Adjudication section of the meeting. C.MONITORING COMPLAINTS (issues 3, 5, 9, 16) Mr. Pryor gave a detailed analysis of the nature of the four issues under the Monitoring Complaints classification for the benefit of the public and committee members. [NAME REDACTED] disagreed with Mr. Pryor’s earlier estimation of the police oversight process and maintained that the only question for any entity to consider was, “What does the